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In the traditional account, American courts transformed the law of waste, 
radically diverging from British courts around the time of the American 
Revolution.  Some of the most influential theorists of American legal history 
have used this account as evidence that American law is driven by economics.  
Due to its adoption by influential scholars, this traditional account of waste 
law has shaped not only our understanding of property law, but also how we 
view the process of transforming law. 
That traditional account, however, came not from a history of the doctrine, 
but from an elaboration of the benefits of the modern rule in comparison with 
the drawbacks of the earlier, common law rule.  A full history, reaching back 
to the common law doctrine has not been written until now.  This Article 
provides a legal history of the doctrine of waste, exploring the original com-
mon law doctrine prior to the nineteenth century transformation, and demon-
strating the multiple flaws of the traditional account. 
This Article demonstrates that there is little support for the traditional 
story of a radical and American break motivated by land development.  A full 
account demonstrates that the change was not radical, but rather consistent 
with centuries of British law.  The shift also was not particularly American, 
but rather roughly contemporaneous with and parallel to a British shift.  Most 
importantly, courts in both countries shifted doctrines to address a change in 
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the technology of surveying and title recordation, rather than in response to 
economic forces. 
This new history of waste law also offers a critique of theories of the trans-
formation of law, along with current methods in legal history that privilege 
social factors and economic circumstances and largely abandon the traditional 
legal history methods of tracing the evolution of doctrine.  Abandoning doc-
trine and privileging social factors has detracted from accurately understand-
ing both legal transformation and the role of law—and particularly property 
law—in American society, suggesting that law is much more flexible and re-
sponsive to social change than it necessarily is in everyday politics. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Waste law punishes a tenant for changes to the estate that detri-
mentally impact the inheritance.1  For decades, waste law has present-
ed a peculiar puzzle to scholars. The common law rule strictly pun-
ished changes to property; indeed the common law went so far as to 
punish with treble damages tenants who increased the value of the prop-
erty.2  Even more oddly, the courts forbade waiving waste liability 
within a contract.3  As a result, courts would punish, again with treble 
damages, tenants who made valuable improvements—despite leases 
that had permitted the tenant to make precisely those improvements.4
Eventually, courts replaced the strict common law rule with a modern, 
more lenient and value-driven rule.5  The puzzle of the original rule, 
however, remained. 
Morton Horwitz first addressed the puzzle of waste law, explain-
ing socio-economic circumstances that he argued account for the mod-
ernization of the rule and, simultaneously, rationalized the old, strict 
rule.6  In Horwitz’s account American courts broke from the English 
rule and embraced a uniquely American perspective that supported 
economic development and natural resource exploitation; a lack of 
similar pressures for land development in England then explained the 
old, strict rule.7  Other persuasive legal thinkers, including John 
1. RICHARD R. POWELL, 8 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 56.01 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 
2000).
2. RALEIGH COLSTON MINOR & JOHN WURTS, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 381, 392 
(1910).
3. See infra Section II.A. 
4. See infra Section III.B.4. 
5. POWELL, supra note 1, § 56.02. 
6. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860, at 30 
(1977).
7. Id.
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Sprankling8 and Jed Purdy,9 adopted this view. 
One might argue that socio-economic pressures are a weak expla-
nation for the puzzle of the strict common law rule.  There is, however, 
a more critical problem: the history, when examined in detail, does not 
support the traditional account of transformation. 
Only a long-range historical perspective provides the necessary 
context to understand later doctrinal shifts—and to fully explain the 
puzzle of the strict common law rule.  This Article provides the first 
full history of waste law, examining the common law well before the 
transformation, along with the history of waste within the British 
courts.  Such a perspective indicates a key problem with traditional ac-
counts of waste law.  Incorrectly, the traditional transformation story 
presumes that historically waste performed only one legal function: 
maintaining property values.10
This Article demonstrates that waste law performed not one but 
two distinct functions: property value maintenance and boundary 
maintenance.  By developing a history of English waste law and its 
transformation—chapters that have been missing from the literature—
this Article demonstrates that in the common law waste performed 
both of these distinct functions.11  Recognizing these two functions ex-
plains why the common law rule strictly forbade ameliorative waste, 
often punishing it with treble damages.  In ameliorative waste, the 
changes to the property increase rather than decrease value.12  Punish-
ing such changes seems illogical if one looks to waste law solely for 
maintaining property values.  Yet, as this Article will demonstrate, the 
boundary-maintenance function explains this outcome.  Common law 
courts punished ameliorative waste because such changes jeopardized 
the evidence of boundaries, which were designated on the land itself 
by land uses rather than on paper via maps or metes and bounds as we 
8. John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 519, 533 (1996). 
9. See Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist Inter-
pretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653 (2006). 
10. See infra Parts II, III. 
11. Previous narratives tended to ignore the boundary-making function entirely.  Mer-
rill only gives the old rule of preventing injury to the title a footnote. See Thomas W. Mer-
rill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. and the Doctrine of Waste in American Property Law, 94 
MARQ. L. REV. 1055, 1058 n.19 (2011).  Purdy briefly mentions the rule against injury to title, 
but does not discuss it further.  Purdy, supra note 9, at 663–64. 
12. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, §§ 381, 395. 
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expect in modern society.13
This Article demonstrates that the modern value-focused rule, 
which does not punish ameliorative waste, results from modern meth-
ods of surveying and recording titles, which displaced the need for the 
physical description of the landscape to act as a boundary.  Waste law 
changed as a result of the professionalization and modernization of 
surveying, along with innovations in title recording, which made the 
boundary maintenance function obsolete.  As a result, courts eliminat-
ed the boundary function and reemphasized the remaining value func-
tion, maintaining a deep fidelity to the English legal tradition.  This 
American doctrinal shift mirrored a contemporaneous English one.  
Rather than America’s doctrine changing to take advantage of land 
opening to development, both English and American doctrines shifted 
in response to the professionalization and modernization of surveying.  
As this Article will establish, law was responsive not to the socio-
economic pressures of land development but to the routine advances 
of technology, particularly in a situation where a doctrine could be ad-
justed by removing one now-obsolete prong of a test and reinforcing 
the existing ones. 
Establishing this more accurate understanding of waste law mat-
ters beyond the bounds of property law.  Like Horwitz, other persua-
sive legal thinkers, including John Sprankling14 and Jed Purdy,15 have 
employed the traditional story of the transformation of waste law to 
support larger assertions about the transformation of American law to 
support economic development and, in particular, industrialization.  
Waste law has regularly figured into American legal theory for the last 
fifty years.16
Ultimately, this Article critiques both a particular theory of the na-
ture of American law and its amenability to transformation and the 
methodology of modern legal history—a methodology largely adopted 
13. Id. § 381. 
14. Sprankling, supra note 8, at 533. 
15. See Purdy, supra note 9. 
16. For their part, property scholars often use waste law to engage theoretical quanda-
ries. See Merrill, supra note 11, at 1055 (explaining that waste law “has held a peculiar fasci-
nation for property theorists”). John Lovett also has argued for the importance of waste.  
John A. Lovett, Doctrines of Waste in a Landscape of Waste, 72 MO. L. REV. 1209, 1227 (2007).  
Posner seems to have considered disagreeing, but acknowledged that Lovett “argues force-
fully for the continued practical importance of the doctrine of waste.”  Richard A. Posner, 
Comment on Merrill on the Law of Waste, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1095, 1099 n.9 (2011). 
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due to Horwitz’s vast influence on the field.17  This Article argues that 
legal historians have largely abandoned their native methodology of 
tracing the evolution of doctrine in favor of law and society approach-
es that seek social and economic explanations for legal change.  When 
historians focus on social factors and economic circumstances that may 
influence law without giving much attention to law’s power to resist 
social change and maintain fidelity to past precedents, they not only 
create less accurate historical accounts, but also skew perceptions of 
the role of law in society.  Privileging the social context above tracing 
the evolution of legal doctrines ultimately distorts the role of law—and 
particularly property law—in American society, suggesting that it was 
much more flexible and responsive to socio-economic change than it 
necessarily was. 
The focus on law as a construct effective for achieving social, eco-
nomic, and spatial goals can distort the nature of law as an independ-
ent and stable structure of society—one that much more often than not 
affirms existing rights and investments, particularly where property is 
concerned.  Too much emphasis on social contexts, and particularly on 
anachronistic future outcomes such as environmental destruction, ne-
glects the role of law as a conservative force in society—one that 
makes changes, particularly in property rights, more difficult to 
achieve.  The argument does not aim to displace the practice of exam-
ining the impacts of social and economic forces on law, but rather to 
suggest that we have gone too far on the continuum, favoring social 
explanations for legal change and ignoring consistencies maintained 
through the evolution of doctrine.  This Article argues for reintegrating 
the distinctly legal history methodology of tracing the evolution of 
doctrine and simultaneously demonstrates this corrected methodolo-
gy. 
Following this introduction (Part I), Part II sets forth the original 
common law rule of waste.  Part II then turns to the shift to the mod-
ern rule, outlining how various scholars have described the doctrinal 
shift.  Parts III and IV cumulatively develop a new history of waste 
law.  Part III focuses on waste law prior to the doctrinal shift, detailing 
the previously undescribed boundary maintenance function.  Part III 
elaborates the process of marking boundaries through land uses and 
the role of waste law in preventing changes that would muddy those 
17. See infra Section II.B.1. 
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land use boundaries.  Part IV then provides a new account of the trans-
formation, both in British law and in American law.  Part IV draws on 
the history provided in Part III to explain how changes in technology 
provided new methods of maintaining boundaries much more effec-
tively than was possible by simply using waste law to maintain exist-
ing land uses.  In its final section, Part IV summarizes the merits of this 
new account of the transformation of waste law and details how it 
provides a more accurate understanding of waste law when compared 
with the traditional accounts.  Part V addresses the timing of the 
shift—explaining how the new history of waste law answers the chro-
nology question.  Finally, Part VI uses the new history to develop a cri-
tique of current theory and methods in legal history, focusing on why 
so many similar accounts of waste law existed, but none of those ac-
counts engaged the doctrine within its historical context prior to the 
doctrine shift.  This Part then develops a prescription for modern legal 
historians to correct recent tendencies that may skew our understand-
ing of legal transformation and the role of law in society. 
II. THE COMMON LAW RULE AND TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTS OF THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF WASTE LAW
A. The Common Law Rule of Waste
It is appropriate to begin with the strict common law rule of waste.  
A cause of action for waste allows a reversioner18 to recover against a 
tenant for changes to the estate that detrimentally impact the inher-
itance.19  Waste arises in a variety of contexts, including life estates, re-
versions, leases, and dower property.20  The common law has long pro-
18. For the sake of simplicity, I will use the terms “reversioner” and “plaintiff” synon-
ymously for the party who will next take possession of the property and who would be al-
leging waste.  I will use the terms “tenant” or “defendant” synonymously for the party who 
currently has rights to occupy the property and who may be held liable for waste.  Because 
the technical differences have no bearing on the argument made, I have simplified the ter-
minology.
19. POWELL, supra note 1, § 56.01. 
20. For further discussions of how both the parties liable for waste and the parties sit-
uated to bring an action for waste have changed, see MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, §§ 390–
93 (describing, separately, who is “punishable for waste” and who is “entitled to complain 
of waste”).  Initially, formal procedures limited the parties able to receive relief.  POWELL,
supra note 1, § 56.02.  Bewes finds that in the oldest formulation, only three parties were lia-
ble for waste, because they were liable via the operation of law, rather than “by contract or 
quasi contract”: “tenants in dower and by the curtesy, and guardians in chivalry.”  
WYNDHAM ANSTIS BEWES, THE LAW OF WASTE 1 (1894).  But not all scholars agree on the 
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tected the reversioner’s interests.  The Statute of Marlebridge (Marl-
borough) (1267) provided that “[a]lso fermors,21 during their terms, 
shall not make waste, sale nor exile of house, woods, and men, nor of 
anything belonging to the tenements that they have to ferm.”22
Waste may be either permissive or voluntary.23  Permissive waste 
arises not through malicious actions, but instead through some omis-
sion.24  A tenant might notice a weak support for the porch roof, but 
rather than reinforcing the support, ignores the problem.25  The ten-
ant’s omission ultimately results in the collapse of the roof, creating li-
precise evolution of liabilities and standing; see George W. Kirchwey, Liability for Waste, 8 
COLUM. L. REV. 425, 425–26, 437 (1908) (discussing the shifting liabilities of parties over 
time). 
21. Some commentators have translated the term “fermors” as a misspelling of “farm-
ers.” See Purdy, supra note 9, at 662.  This is not historically accurate.  Fermors held a specif-
ic meaning in the common law, which was not synonymous with the general term for agri-
cultural occupations.  “The term ‘fermors’ comprehends all who hold by lease for life or 
lives or for years, by deed or without deed.”  JOSEPH HAWORTH REDMAN, THE LAW OF 
LANDLORD AND TENANT 256 (5th ed. 1901) (citing 2 COKE’S INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF 
ENGLAND 145 (1642)). 
22. POWELL, supra note 1, § 56.02. 
23. Many modern writers divide waste into three categories, voluntary, permissive, 
and ameliorating. E.g., Merrill, supra note 11, at 1057.  There is a certain oddity to this 
alignment, because the only difference between voluntary and ameliorating waste is that 
the value of the property increases. This means that creating a third category destroys the 
neat alignment of a division otherwise based on the type of conduct by the tenant (act or 
omission).  Additionally, at first glance it suggests that ameliorating waste would not be 
voluntary, and yet one struggles to imagine a scenario in which it is not.  The three catego-
ries are a modern trend, and one that, for the reasons stated, may not best organize our 
thoughts on the subject.  Here, I have preferred following the historic trend of treatise writ-
ers who divided waste only into voluntary and permissive, treating amelioration as a sub-
species. See ARTHUR W. BLAKEMORE, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 323 (1917) (describing two 
types of waste, permissive and voluntary); 1 CHARLES T. BOONE, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
300 (1901) (categorizing two types of waste, permissive and voluntary); MINOR & WURTS,
supra note 2, §§ 380–81 (categorizing waste as either voluntary or permissive, and later dis-
cussing amelioration within those structures); GEORGE V. YOOL, AN ESSAY ON WASTE,
NUISANCE, AND TRESPASS 3 (1863) (describing ameliorating waste, then concluding that all 
waste is “either voluntary or permissive”). 
24. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, §§ 380–81, 386. 
25. In its strictest formulation at the common law, this went so far as to include liabil-
ity for a house burning down by “mischance,” which suggests that liability occurs even if 
the tenant was not negligent.  YOOL, supra note 23, at 56.  Although it seems to require some 
act, if accidental, of the tenant, who must have so “misadventure[d].”  2 WILLIAM WAIT, A
TREATISE UPON SOME OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 113 (1877).  This may be con-
trasted with acts of god or nature, such as lightning or tempests that might also burn down 
a house.  3 WILLIAM DOUGLAS EDWARDS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN 
LAND 68 (3d ed. 1896). 
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ability for permissive waste.  When voluntary waste occurs, the tenant 
acted to harm the property.26  The tenant might simply tear down the 
porch, giving the reversioner a cause of action for voluntary waste. 
Under the common law rule, whether the allegation was for per-
missive or voluntary waste, the rule required the reversioner to prove 
some impairment of the inheritance.  To establish an impairment of the 
inheritance, the common law of waste required damage through at 
least one of three mechanisms: “(1) [b]y diminishing the value of the 
estate; (2) [b]y increasing the burthen upon it; (3) [b]y impairing the 
evidence of title.”27
The common law enforced waste strictly, holding landowners re-
sponsible for virtually all changes to the landscape.28  The common law 
forbade a tenant from “convert[ing] ancient meadow into arable, or ar-
able or pasture into wood.”29  In general, the tenant “ha[d] no power to 
change the nature of the thing demised.”30
Voluntary waste contained an important subcategory, ameliorative 
waste, which is key to understanding the shift to modern waste law.  
With ameliorative waste, there is a fundamental change in the nature 
of the property—something forbidden under the strict rule—but that 
change increases the value.  Suppose the property contains a home in a 
somewhat industrialized area of town and the tenant tears down the 
home to build a storefront.  While the land with the home was valued 
at $60,000, the land with the storefront is valued at $120,000.  In such 
circumstances, the tenant committed ameliorative waste.  The tenant 
has violated the technical requirement not to change the nature of the 
inheritance, but the tenant has economically advantaged rather than 
damaged the reversioner.  The common law rule was known for its 
strict enforcement of the ancient law, forbidding all changes to the 
property, even when those changes would economically benefit the 
reversioner.31
26. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, §§ 380–81. 
27. YOOL, supra note 23, at 2. 
28. Id.; 1 BOONE, supra note 23, at 306.  Bewes describes the courts as applying the 
common law standard “with merciless severity.”  BEWES, supra note 20, at 9. 
29. Greene v. Cole (1669) 85 Eng. Rep. 1037 (KB) 1047. 
30. Id.; YOOL, supra note 23, at 1 (citing Darcy v. Askwith (1618) 80 Eng. Rep. 380 (KB)). 
31. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, § 380.  One might argue that the ameliorative appli-
cations of waste law also protected the owner’s right to be different or idiosyncratic.  While 
occasionally cases do mention that the reversioner has a right to the thing that was initially 
in existence, such occasional comments do not really support an idea of individual rights 
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Remedies for waste included both injunctions and damages 
awards.  Courts rarely bothered with nominal damages,32 but other-
wise enforced waste law stringently, using treble damage awards,33 as 
well as injunctions to prevent changes to land that might destroy evi-
dence of the title.34  If damages had been the sole remedy, tenants 
might have pursued ameliorative waste and made changes to the 
property for the purposes of economic development, but both treble 
damage awards and injunctions prevented such choices. 
The strict common law rule initially found root in America, but 
eventually American courts adopted a new approach to waste.  A 
number of historians and property theorists have examined the adop-
tion of the new rule and used this transformation to support broader 
assertions about the nature and malleability of law. 
B. Traditional Accounts of the Transformation of Waste Law
1. Horwitz on the Shift to the New Rule
Morton J. Horwitz, expanding on James Willard Hurst’s approach 
of incorporating social context into analyses of legal change,35 pro-
duced one of the foundational accounts of legal history using a socio-
economic lens.  He set out to prove that “[b]y 1820 the legal landscape 
in America bore only the faintest resemblance to what had existed for-
ty years earlier.”36  Horwitz created a narrative of the transformation 
of waste law in the United States, using this narrative as evidence of 
the developing distance between English and American law.37  Ameri-
very effectively because so many of the cases of waste involve not a property that will re-
turn to the same person, but a property that will be held by one person before being passed 
on to another. In other words, much of the time we are protecting John’s right to receive the 
falling-down barn that his uncle gifted to him (after a life estate), not John’s right to receive 
back his falling-down barn. 
32. BEWES, supra note 20, at 130. 
33. See id. at 9 (discussing the “merciless” application of the rule, including treble 
damages, in cases of ameliorative waste). 
34. 1 WILLIAM CRUISE, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL
PROPERTY 67 (1804). 
35. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW (1950); JAMES WILLARD
HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED
STATES (1956).  Scholars generally credit Hurst with leading American legal historians away 
from a strict examination of legal reasoning to a more robust account of legal developments, 
incorporating the social and economic contexts of those changes. 
36. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 30. 
37. Id. at 55, 59. 
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can courts, he argued, had transformed English law rapidly and dras-
tically.38
More importantly, Horwitz identified the particular forces behind 
that transformation as economic.  “[A]n economy dependent on clear-
ing land for economic development,” he argued, “could not enforce a 
rule of maintaining the existing condition of land.  From the moment 
of independence from England, therefore, American jurists devoted 
their efforts to modifying or overturning the received common law 
doctrine.”39  Horwitz concluded that “the premise that underlay the 
changing law of waste was that it was preferable to encourage imme-
diate improvement by tenants.”40
Horwitz’s argument regarding waste law was not entirely novel.  
Other, more skeletal accounts of the transformation of waste already 
had followed Hurst’s example and looked to social forces for sources 
of legal change.  For example, the 1920 edition of Tiffany’s Real Proper-
ty’s described “[t]he general tendency of American courts” as “re-
strict[ing] the application of the English law of waste, in order to adapt 
it to the conditions of a new and growing country, and to stimulate the 
development of the land by the tenant in possession.”41  In 1930 a Har-
vard Law Review article by an unnamed author briefly stated that the 
change in doctrines in England was spurred by “the rise of the indus-
trial movement of the early nineteenth century.”42  The author con-
cluded that American courts followed suit “in an effort to encourage 
the rapid development of property.”43
 For Horwitz, the story of waste law simply demonstrated “the 
transition from an eighteenth century understanding of private law as 
fixed doctrine to one in which private law adjudication became a crea-
tive instrument for promoting social change and economic growth.”44
More specifically, he saw the changes in waste law as a part of a larger 
project of commodifying land and “freeing land from both social con-
trols and inconvenient existing claims, held by smallholders, in order 
38. Id.
39. Id. at 54. 
40. Id. at 58. 
41. 1 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND OTHER
INTERESTS IN LAND 951 (2d ed. 1920). 
42. Liability for Ameliorative Waste, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1131 (1930). 
43. Id.
44. Lovett, supra note 16, at 1227. 
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to make it available as a capital-generating resource for the economic 
development of the continent.”45  For Horwitz, the story of waste law 
formed a contributing narrative to the overall story of how Americans 
reshaped the common law to support burgeoning economic develop-
ment, both industrialization and the project of claiming and taming the 
land. 
2. Sprankling on the Shift to the New Rule 
Like Horwitz, Sprankling utilized the transformation of waste law 
as evidence of a much larger trend in American law.46  Horwitz’s nar-
rative, along with Hurst’s influence more generally, shaped Spran-
kling’s environmental approach to understanding the transformation 
of waste law.47  Sprankling focused on the role of law in the destruc-
tion of wilderness land.48  Sprankling argued that law developed a 
substantial bias towards development.49  This bias, he argued, was not 
accidental, but rather the product of “judges retool[ing] English prop-
erty law doctrines to meet the conditions in the new United States.”50
When Sprankling spoke of meeting the new conditions, he did not 
mean that law simply flexed to meet new scenarios, but rather that 
judges specifically reworked the common law to “further economic 
development.”51
The transformation of waste law formed the very heart of his evi-
dence; it was, by his estimation, “the most obvious example of anti-
wilderness retooling.”52  Sprankling cast the strict, common law rule as 
a force for conservation.  English property law, if adopted wholesale, 
“was a poor tool for encouraging the exploitation of virgin land.”53
When examining English property law, Sprankling found that the 
“system focused on preserving the condition of land already in pro-
ductive use in a mature agrarian economy.”54  English waste law, in 
45. Purdy, supra note 9, at 661. 
46. Sprankling, supra note 8, at 533. 
47. Id. at 521. 
48. Id. at 519. 
49. Id. at 521. 
50. Id.
51. Id. at 522. 
52. Id. at 533. 
53. Id. at 523. 
54. Id. at 524–25. 
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particular, “tended to perpetuate the land-use status quo.”55  Spran-
kling concluded that given the landscape conditions in England, the 
country’s waste law “unsurprisingly favored conservation.”56  The 
English doctrine, Sprankling concludes, “would have arrested devel-
opment.”57
Sprankling contrasted the common law with the modern rule, 
which he saw as American courts refashioning waste to allow land 
clearing.58  The American courts were, he concluded, “[d]riven by [an] 
instrumentalist vision.”59  As a result, he describes the American courts 
as “resoundingly jettison[ing]” the English approach to waste.60
3. Purdy on the Transformation of American Waste Law
Purdy develops his analysis of waste law both in an article focus-
ing on the topic exclusively61 and, briefly, in his recent book.62  Purdy 
examines the transformation of waste law asking “[w]hat causes ac-
count for the development of property regimes across time.”63  He 
both accepts and challenges the narratives built by Horwitz and 
Sprankling.  First, Purdy accepts Horwitz and Sprankling’s primary 
argument that economic forces “help[] to explain the change.”64  To 
this explanation, however, Purdy adds other forces, finding that “the 
full story, however, emerges only upon consideration of two other in-
fluences on waste doctrine: republican political culture, and the belief 
that European settlers were under a natural-law obligation to subdue 
the American wilderness and make it a fruitful, agrarian landscape.”65
Purdy ultimately concludes that courts adopt the new rule “to pro-
mote efficient use of resources that the English rule would have inhib-
ited.”66
Like both Horwitz and Sprankling, Purdy uses the transformation 
55. Id. at 534. 
56. Id.
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 534–35. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 535. 
61. Purdy, supra note 9, at 654. 
62. JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY 45–47 (2010). 
63. Purdy, supra note 9, at 653. 
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 661. 
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of waste law to make a larger argument about American property law.  
The transformation in waste law, Purdy concludes, “is suggestive of 
the plurality of values at work in American land regimes generally.”67
When it comes to narrating the transformation, Purdy relies pri-
marily on Jackson v. Brownson.68  He cites a dissent, which noted that 
the old rule was “inapplicable to a new, unsettled country.”69  Purdy 
finds that other courts followed the Jackson decision, adopting the good 
husbandry approach because “American courts envisioned this flexi-
bility in contrast to the fixity of the English rule, which they saw as po-
tentially locking the tenant into existing land-use patterns and forbid-
ding the mutually beneficial activity that the American standard 
embraces.”70
4. Merrill on the Moment of Transformation
Following the trend, Merrill used the transformation of waste law 
as a way of engaging the question of the function of property in socie-
ty.  Merrill viewed the strict, common law rule as “consistent with the 
view of property as an individual right,” and with promoting “auton-
omy, security, the ability to make long-term plans, [and] the right to be 
different.”71  He reasoned that the new waste rule was less about indi-
vidual rights and more about “the view of property as a social institu-
tion.”72  The new rule, Merrill found, was a way to manage conflict 
when there were temporary transfers that are likely to cause such con-
flict.73  Merrill, then, saw the transformation of waste law in terms of 
the continual conflict in property theory—the “fundamental question,” 
as he puts it—of “whether property is an individual right or social in-
stitution.”74  He extended his interpretation of Melms v. Pabst Brewing 
67. Purdy cites both a practical, economic justification behind the new waste rule and 
multiple cultural reasons (both economic and sociopolitical). Purdy argues that the new 
rule has a “mixed profile.”  On the one hand, it “promot[es] efficiency in contracting.” On 
the other hand, “its introduction can be convincingly explained as an expression of the 
then-current commitments in America to republicanism and economic dynamism.”  Ulti-
mately, Purdy uses this multiple causation approach to argue that “a default rule can have 
normative as well as efficiency-enhancing functions.” Id. at 661–62. 
68.  Id. at 668–69. 
69.  Id. at 670. 
70.  Id. at 676. 
71. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1059. 
72. Id.
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 1060. 
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Co.75 as a landmark case in waste law to “a bellwether for assessing our 
understanding of the basic purposes of property law.”76
Merrill dismissed the explanations given by Horwitz, Purdy, and 
Sprankling, arguing that “[the] transformation was not a manifestation 
of inexorable social and economic change.  Rather, it was a top-down 
reform introduced by the Legal Realist movement.”77  Merrill de-
scribed two conflicting decisions—Melms, a Wisconsin case that adopt-
ed the new rule,78 and Brokaw v. Fairchild,79 a New York case that re-
jected the new rule—as well as subsequent, successful lobbying after 
Brokaw that persuaded the New York legislature to adopt a new statute 
in line with the Melms decision.80  Merrill concluded that the Melms
rule prevailed because “[t]he New York reform proved to be highly in-
fluential with bodies such as the American Law Institute, which also 
adopted a test consistent with Melms for inclusion in the Restatement of 
Property.”81  Merrill concluded that the American Law Institute and the 
New York Law Review Commission favored the new rule because it 
“embod[ied] the view of property as a social institution.”82  Whereas 
the strict, common law rule allowed the reversioner to maintain idio-
syncratic views about the ideal use of his property, the new rule al-
lowed the law to “facilitate the efforts of individuals to reach the cor-
rect answer, without regard to what particular individuals with 
possibly idiosyncratic views might think.”83  For Merrill, the new rule 
fostered development, because it allowed society to determine “the 
highest and best use of land” rather than maintaining existing uses.84
At a more theoretical level, Merrill concluded the new rule embodied 
an overall shift in American jurisprudence toward a more social con-
cept of property.85
75. 104 Wis. 7, 8, 79 N.W. 738, 738 (1899). 
76. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1060. 
77. Id. at 1080. 
78. Melms, 104 Wis. at 13–15. 
79. 237 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1929), aff’d mem. per curiam, 245 N.Y.S. 402 (App. Div. 1930), 
aff’d mem. per curiam, 177 N.E. 186 (N.Y. 1931). 
80. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1082–83. 
81.  Id. at 1083. 
82.  Id.
83.  Id.
84.  Id.
85.  Id.
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III. A NEW HISTORY OF WASTE LAW: THE COMMON LAW RULE AND 
LAND USE AS BOUNDARIES
Each of these accounts of the change assumed that waste law pro-
vided only one legal function.  Understanding the true reason for the 
shift, which happened not only in America but also in the very differ-
ent land development context of England, requires a full history of the 
doctrine, and particularly a history that looks back to the doctrine be-
fore the shift to determine its multiple purposes.  This Part explains the 
history of the doctrine, detailing how waste law historically protected 
not only property value but also property boundaries.  The first hint of 
this second function is clear in the traditional formulation of the rule in 
the common law.  The common law required damage through at least 
one of three mechanisms: “(1) By diminishing the value of the estate; 
(2) By increasing the burthen upon it; (3) By impairing the evidence of 
title.”86  Waste law maintained boundaries because it prevented 
changes to the land that would impair the evidence of the title.87  This 
rule, in and of itself, however, is not particularly clear without an un-
derstanding of the processes of surveying land prior to industrializa-
tion. 
To provide this historical context, this Part describes the process of 
bounding land in English law, explaining how waste law maintained 
boundaries in a system that allocated land and recorded land owner-
ship through descriptive rather than visual or physical markers, 
through land use and butting and bounding rather than through pre-
cise surveying technology.88  This part begins with a brief history of 
early surveying. 
A. Early Surveying
The first documents described as “maps” of kingdoms were lists 
rather than pictorial representations of the territory.89  Each “map” de-
scribed the various feudal leaders beneath the king, the territories 
held, and their duties to the king such as the number of men providing 
86. YOOL, supra note 23, at 2. 
87. See infra Section III.B. 
88. See infra Section III.B. 
89. See Josef W. Konvitz, The Nation-State, Paris and Cartography in Eighteenth- and Nine-
teenth-Century France, 16 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 3, 7 (1990) (describing the origins of the con-
cept of a map within cartography in France). 
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knight service in the event of war.90  This type of survey, which was 
more a list of attributes of a region than a visual depiction of it, per-
sisted longer than a modern reader might guess. 
For example, as late as the end of the seventeenth century, a survey 
of Scotland resulted in lists rather than maps.  In 1682, when King 
Charles II appointed Sir Robert Sibbald as Geographer Royal, Sibbald 
set out to make a new survey of Scotland.91  Shortly thereafter, he 
printed a large advertisement entreating the many nobles of Scotland 
to send him lists of “[w]hat Seriffdomes, Baillieries, Stewartires, Regal-
ities, Baronies, and Burrows they have under them?”92  Sibbald also 
requested lists of “the Nature of the County,” “the chief products 
thereof,” along with “[w]hat Plants, Animals, Mettals, Substances, cast 
up by the Sea are peculiar to the place.”93  Sibbald warned his readers 
of the consequences of failing to answer his advertisement.94  He ex-
plained, “The answers to these Queries is earnestly desired that no 
person may complain, if what concerns them be not insert[ed].”95  Sib-
bald’s warning likely sought to ensure that no one later complained 
that his properties and rights were omitted from the listing of the 
King’s territories. 
Mirroring these maps of kingdoms, through the sixteenth century 
and the first half of the seventeenth century surveys and maps of es-
tates in land were not visual depictions of streams, forests, fields, and 
manor houses.  Rather, the surveys listed allocated rights in descrip-
tive, but not visual, form.  For example, in 1714, Tristram Risdon pub-
lished a survey of the county of Devon.96  Risdon describes the climate, 
landscapes, industries, and resources of the land, along with a history 
of both property and political control.97  In his extensive book, he in-
90. Id.
91. Robert Sibbald, Advertisement, in the COLLECTIONS OF THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL
LIBRARY (1682). 
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. TRISTRAM RISDON, THE CHOROGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION, OR SURVEY OF THE 
COUNTY OF DEVON (1714).
97. Id. (for example, “[t]he Glebe and Soil of Devonshire is diverse; in the Entrance, on 
the East Part of the Shire, the Mould standeth most upon white Chalk, which is passing 
good for Sheep and Corn; a little farther it consists of a red and blue Marle, which is no 
rocky, but an earthy Substance; this Soil is most natural for pasturing of Beasts, though it be 
plentifully furnish’d with Corn”). 
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cludes one drawing of a building, but no other illustrations or maps of 
the landscape at all.98  Risdon focuses more on listing territorial con-
trols, sherrifdoms, and so forth.99  Similarly, Richard Carew’s survey of 
Cornwall, published in 1769, described the landscape, soil quality, and 
the natural resources available within the area.100  Carew also discusses 
in some detail the process by which a person may claim a particular 
portion of ground on which to dig for tin and how to maintain the le-
gal claim through bounding on an annual basis.101  Like others, Carew 
draws up his survey by listing resources, crops, animals, and the legal 
jurisdictions, or Hundreds, of the county, but includes no drawings or 
maps to visually represent the region.102
The manor survey performed rather the same function as these 
larger surveys, cataloging legal rights through lists.  The manor survey 
listed the various tenants, the amount of land each held, and their var-
ious rights upon the commons such as fire-bote.103  The surveyor found 
“the just Quantity of every Man’s Ground, both Arable, Ley-ground 
and Meadow,” and then prepared a field book to maintain a record of 
the parcels.104
The surveyor kept track of this complex system.  Notably, rather 
than teaching geometry, early guides for surveyors taught basic prop-
erty law.105  Such books included legal descriptions of different rights 
on land and different types of estates in land.106  The early surveyor’s 
guidebook explained the nature of a manor: “A Mannor then consists 
of Lands, Wood, Meadow, Pasture and Arable, Messuages, Tenements, 
Services, and Hereditaments, Whereof part are Demesnes, being such 
as anciently, and ultra memoriam, the Lord has ever used, occupied 
and manured with the Manor-house.  The rest are either Free-holds, 
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. RICHARD CAREW, THE SURVEY OF CORNWALL (1769). 
101. Id. at 12–13. 
102. See id.  Notably, as of 1699, Vincent Wing finds that “very few Authors of Survey-
ing have touched upon” the subject of “Directions for taking the Map of a County.”  
VINCENT WING, A COMPLEAT BODY OF SURVEYING 242 (John Wing ed. 1699).  Wing himself 
devotes approximately one and a half pages to the topic.  Id. at 242–43. 
103. 4 WILLIAM LEYBOURN, THE COMPLEAT SURVEYOR: OR, THE WHOLE ART OF 
SURVEYING OF LAND 102–03 (5th ed. 1722). 
104. Id. at 102. 
105. See id.
106. Id.
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Farms, or customary or copyhold Tenements.”107  The guide would 
then proceed to explain the many types of rights that citizens might 
have upon these particular lands.108  The surveyor’s book would rec-
ord each of the rights, noting private rights to particular parcels as well 
as the many rights that the citizen might hold to the common areas of 
the manor.109
Surveyors also acted much as farm managers or advisors.  Tracts 
celebrating the role of the surveyor portray him as educating the 
farmer or landowner about how grounds can be planted, drained, or 
improved to greater profit over time.110  Instruction manuals for sur-
veyors provided extensive advice on the draining of lands through 
construction of ditches and small-scale canals.111  For example, Cressey 
Dymock’s A Discoverie for Division or Setting out of Land, as to the Best 
Form, spends most of its pages discussing how and why fens and 
marshes of England should be drained as well as how land might be 
improved through the use of manures and fertilizers.112  Similarly, Wil-
liam Leybourn’s The Compleat Surveyor explains how to slowly drain a 
bog, even when “your bog be so tender that you cannot go upon it” by 
locating the springs and creating ditches to channel the water away.113
Even as the surveying profession became more technical and special-
ized throughout the eighteenth century, surveyors continued to advise 
landowners regarding the improvement of lands.114
Early surveyors did not use specialized equipment, but instead 
simply walked the landscape to create descriptive records.  Rather, 
measurements were fluid and approximate,115 often using agricultural 
units.116  Measurements reflected the realities of farming: “a day’s 
107. Id. at 75. 
108. Id. at 76. 
109. Id.
110. See JOHN NORDEN, SURVEYOR’S DIALOGUE (1607); AN OLDE THRIFT NEWLY
REVIVED (1612). 
111. WILLIAM EMERSON, THE ART OF SURVEYING OR MEASURING LAND 135 (1770). 
112. CRESSEY DYMOCK, A DISCOVERIE FOR DIVISION OR SETTING OUT OF LAND, AS TO 
THE BEST FORM (1653) (located in the Collections of the Scottish National Library). 
113. 4 LEYBOURN, supra note 103, at 132. 
114. For example, Emerson describes how a surveyor would determine whether to ad-
vise a landowner to consider building a canal for the purpose of draining land. EMERSON,
supra note 111, at 135. 
115. Shaunnagh Dorsett, Mapping Territories, in JURISPRUDENCE OF JURISDICTION 148 
(Shaun McVeigh ed., 2007). 
116. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, some surveyors endeavored to edu-
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journey or a morning’s ploughing.”117  Putting allocations onto paper 
meant using textual descriptions of the landscape’s uses. 
Newly acquired lands were laid out by a process of perambulation, 
or walking the sides of the land to estimate the acreage acquired and to 
create a written description.118  To construct boundaries between par-
cels, surveyors utilized landscape features, a process known as butting 
and bounding.119  For the very largest parcels, the surveyor might ref-
erence prominent landmarks such as creeks, ravines, bogs, ridges, 
hills, and valleys.120  For smaller plots of land, the most efficient refer-
ence was one that specifically included a land use.121  Thus, a parish 
might be bounded by the “common on the north,” or “Alwardby 
fields” on the west.122  For example, “[t]he manor [of the Parish of 
Aspatria] is of a square form, being bounded by Aspatria Common on 
the north and east sides, by Baggray fields on the south, and by 
Aspatria Field on the west.”123  To describe a particular plot, the sur-
veyor would record the neighboring landscapes: “from such a place to 
such a place, and so on till the starting-point was reached again.”124
cate others about the geometry and mathematics that would provide more accurate meas-
urements of land.  See, e.g., WING, supra note 102.  Notably, Wing seems to assume no 
knowledge of mathematics whatsoever of his reader—beginning with the very basics of 
addition, subtraction, multiplication, fractions, decimals, and so forth. Id. at 1–26.  By the 
end of the eighteenth century, surveying had become more professionalized and more of a 
mathematical process.  Thus, by 1770, William Emerson was able to describe surveying as 
“measuring land,” or “the art of finding the content of any field, or parcel of land; which is 
always expressed in acres and decimal parts.”  EMERSON, supra note 111, at 1. 
117. Dorsett, supra note 115, at 148.  Indeed, surveyors were to some degree intention-
ally inaccurate in reflecting all of the features of a landscape: when surveyors set out to cre-
ate a new division of land, the grant generally prescribed a particular number of acres.  This 
was presumed to refer to arable acres.  Thus the surveyor would stick to a “strict Proportion 
of Quantity” of arable acres.  EDWARD LAURENCE, THE YOUNG SURVEYOR’S GUIDE 174 
(1716).  Thus, “if there . . . be an unuseful Pond, Lake or Puddle, or if there be any Boggy or 
barren Ground, that must be cast out in the Division.”  Id.  The surveyor would “measure 
that first, and subtract it from the Content of whole Close, and then lay the just Quantity of 
the remainder on that side that is free from it.”  Id.  Thus a total of 200 acres described in the 
survey would include more than 200 acres when one included the non-arable portions of 
“that which is useless.”  Id. at 175. 
118. Dorsett, supra note 115, at 141. 
119. LAURENCE, supra note 117, at 174. 
120. Id.
121. 2 WILLIAM HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND 287 
(1794).
122. Id. at 286–87. 
123. Id. at 293. 
124. FREDERIC SEEBOHM, THE ENGLISH VILLAGE COMMUNITY EXAMINED IN ITS 
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The early surveys of counties in England provided only the largest di-
visions of land uses: moors, forests, hills, commons; even smaller scale 
maps of town areas that showed individual plots still described land 
uses such as fen, woods, meers, and mown grounds.125
Even once surveyors began producing pictorial descriptions of es-
tates, drawing in rivers and fields and houses, they continued to note 
land uses on the drawings, either by text or by a series of symbols set 
out in surveyors’ guidebooks.126  Surveyors labeled areas as meadows, 
common pasture, or planted land.127  Guidebooks admonished survey-
ors to illustrate their woods by “draw[ing] diverse little Trees in the 
most material places,” and to use “shadow” to show “mountain[s] and 
uneven Grounds with Hills and Valleys.”128  Such land uses divided 
properties in both written and visual depictions until surveyors moved 
toward modern, geometrical depictions. 
B. Boundary Enforcement with Waste Law
1. Waste, Boundaries & Land Use
In a world without mathematical surveys, land uses efficiently es-
tablished boundaries.  As Chief Justice Tindal explained, “[i]n grants, 
land frequently passes by the specific description of meadow, pasture, 
arable, or the like.”129  Altering the land use then could “introduce con-
siderable difficulty in the title.”130  Even in 1831, Tindal found that “[i]t 
is the daily practice of this court to amend fines and recoveries, on ac-
count of the misdescription of the quality of the land; and the ground 
for making such amendments is that these documents are preserved 
and handed down, as certifying the title to, and identifying the lands, 
by reference to the purposes to which they have been applied.”131
Waste law protected the evidence of title through one of its three 
RELATIONS TO THE MANORIAL AND TRIBAL SYSTEMS AND TO THE COMMON OR OPEN FIELD
SYSTEM OF HUSBANDRY 375 (4th ed. 1890). 
125. See generally MAGNA BRITANNIA ET HIBERNIA (1720) (illustrating English regions 
by depicting common land uses). 
126. CATHERINE DELANO-SMITH & ROGER J.P. KAIN, ENGLISH MAPS: A HISTORY 24 
(1999).
127. Id.
128. 4 LEYBOURN, supra note 103, at 114. 
129. Simmons v. Norton (1831) All ER (CPD) 345. See also Simmons v. Norton (1831) 
131 Eng. Rep. 247 (CPD). 
130. Simmons v. Norton (1831) All ER (CPD) 345. 
131. Id.
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traditional prongs.  Traditionally, waste could be proven by (1) “a di-
minishing of the value of the estate,” (2) “an increasing of the burdens 
upon it,” or (3) “an impairing of the evidence of title.”132  The third 
function of waste was specifically designed to address land use chang-
es.  As Lord Coke explained, changing a land use changes “the evi-
dence of the estate.”133  If the tenant made such a change, he could 
“caus[e] a difficulty in afterwards proving the identity of the premis-
es.”134  In a time prior to formalized mathematical surveys and deed 
registries, “w[aste] was a matter of great importance,” precisely due to 
its ability to protect land from “injury to title.”135  Lord Coke explained 
“if the land be described as arable in the deeds and on view the land is 
found to be pasture, some special evidence is necessary to prove the 
identity.”136
Following the rule strictly, courts forbade material alterations of 
buildings, because those buildings were likely a part of the evidence of 
title.137  In other words, to change the buildings was to “change the 
identity of the estate.”138  For example, in Cole v. Forth, the defendant 
“pulled down a brew-house and built a number of small tenements in 
lieu thereof.”139  While the court found that the property rent increased 
by eighty pounds per year, the Court of King’s Bench determined that 
it was “waste notwithstanding the improvement, because of the nature 
of the thing and of the evidence was altered.”140  Alterations to a build-
ing that did not change its function or overall size and location might 
or might not be waste; it was a question for the jury as to whether or 
not such a change “affected the evidence of the plaintiff’s title.”141  In 
132. 1 BOONE, supra note 23, at 300. 
133. COKE ON LITTLETON § 53 (8th ed. 1822); Simmons v. Norton (1831) All ER 343 
(CPD). Simmons explains using this example: “Ploughing old meadow land and converting 
it to arable is waste; it alters the evidence of the title.” Id.
134. Young v. Spencer (1829) 109 Eng. Rep. 405 (KB) 408. 
135. BEWES, supra note 20, at 130. 
136. COKE ON LITTLETON § 53b. 
137. Liability for Ameliorative Waste, supra note 42, at 1130. 
138. JOHN WILLARD, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 373 (1875). 
139. Cole v. Forth (1672) 86 Eng. Rep. 759; 1 Mod. 94 (cited in 2 THE REPORTS OF THE 
MOST LEARNED SIR EDMUND SAUNDERS 258 (Edward Vaughan Williams ed., 6th ed. 1846)). 
140. Id. (quoted in 2 THE REPORTS OF THE MOST LEARNED SIR EDMUND SAUNDERS 258 
(Edward Vaughan Williams ed., 6th ed. 1846) 259). 
141. Young v. Spencer (1829) 109 Eng. Rep. 405 (KB), quoted in 2 SAUNDERS supra note 
139, at 259 (finding that the opening of a new door to a building might or might not be 
waste, and that it was a question for the jury to decide as to whether the change impact the 
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general, however, changes to the size of a building or the construction 
of a new building would be waste because “the consequent alteration 
in the description of the premises might impair the evidence of the 
owner’s title.”142  This included changes to the inside of a building to 
the degree that they might no longer align with a title description.143
It did not matter if the landscape change was “compatible with 
good husbandry,” only that it had damaged the ability of others to dis-
cern the boundaries of the estate.  Therefore “cutting down hedges, 
which serve as fences, or as the monuments of boundaries, is 
Waste.”144  For the same reason, waste occurred with “[t]he conversion 
of one species of land into another, as the changing of meadow into ar-
able.”145  A defendant committed waste when he plowed up land that 
had been used as pasture.146  Thus, courts would restrain tenants from 
ploughing either meadow or pasture ground.147
Because economic value was not the issue and maintenance of 
boundary lines through preservation of distinct land uses was para-
mount, injunctions rather than damage awards were the remedy for 
these types of waste actions.  In response to suits, the courts would 
“award a perpetual injunction to restrain waste by ploughing, burning, 
breaking, or sowing of down land.”148
Cutting down trees potentially offended two of the three waste 
prongs.149  Cutting down timber could change the evidence of the es-
tate, by making what was labeled “wood” or “forest” on a land de-
scription or map into either meadow or arable land.150  Because 
evidence of title). 
142. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, § 381. 
143. BEWES, supra note 20, at 11–13, 167. 
144. JAMES SULLIVAN, THE HISTORY OF LAND TITLES IN MASSACHUSETTS 335 (1801). 
145. 1 CRUISE, supra note 34, at 67. 
146. Gunning v. Gunning (1678) 89 Eng. Rep. 759 (KB). 
147. Cole v. Peyson (1637) 21 Eng. Rep. 106; Atkins v. Temple (1626) 21 Eng. Rep. 493 
(“A tenant will be restrained at the instance of the owner of the inheritance from ploughing 
up ancient pasture; such ploughing is as much waste as the ploughing of meadow.”). 
148. 1 CRUISE, supra note 34, at 67. 
149. For nineteenth century discussions of the complexities of English law on waste 
and timber, see YOOL, supra note 23, at 22–33; BEWES, supra note 20, at 98–102; for the tradi-
tional common law rules on timber, see COKE ON LITTLETON § 53a–b (8th ed. 1822).  Addi-
tionally, not all trees count as timber.  The “custom of particular places” determines which 
trees are timber.  See CHARLES WATKINS, PRINCIPLES OF CONVEYANCING 33 (John Merrifield 
ed., 8th ed. 1833) (finding that the definition of timber varied across England, depending on 
local custom). 
150. Maleverer v. Spinke (1537) 73 Eng. Rep. 79, 80 (holding that removing timber 
39285-m
qt_100-3 Sheet No. 111 Side B      06/19/2017   09:53:44
39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 111 Side B      06/19/2017   09:53:44
C M
Y K
4 FRALEY-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/17 1:56 PM
884 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:861 
boundary-maintenance was the primary purpose, the rule also worked 
in reverse—despite the scarcity of timber, it was also waste to change 
“arable land into wood.”151  On the other hand, in a country where 
timber was scarce, cutting down trees could also reduce the value of 
the property significantly.  Given that cutting timber potentially of-
fended both prongs of waste, cutting trees generally constituted waste 
under the common law.152
The strictness of waste law demonstrates the importance of the 
boundary-maintenance function.  This is particularly clear in light of 
the common law’s normal tendency to prefer arable land to all oth-
ers.153  Penalizing the ploughing of ancient meadows, an action which 
would convert the land into the preferred arable state,154 speaks direct-
ly to the vital importance of the land use as a boundary-setting mecha-
nism. 
Additionally, recognizing the boundary-maintenance function of 
waste law explains certain results, such as treble damages when the 
reversioner profited from the property change, that otherwise seem 
patently unfair.155  To explain centuries of such rulings by courts oth-
erwise quite interested in a natural concept of fairness or justice, one 
must focus on the damage that may have been done to the title and 
boundaries of a property through even a financially positive change to 
the landscape. 
2. The Boundary Maintenance Function and the Good Husbandry 
Standard
Some cases confusingly speak of a change in the “course of hus-
bandry” being forbidden by waste law.156  This general statement was 
damages evidence of title). 
151. WILLARD, supra note 138, at 373. 
152. 1 BOONE, supra note 23, at 301. 
153. Lord Coke wrote upon this subject in multiple contexts.  See BEWES, supra note 20, 
at 30–31 (quoting and discussing Lord Coke and others on the common law preference for 
arable lands).  For a further discussion of the common law preference for arable lands, see 
Jill Fraley, The Anti-Wilderness Bias in the Common Law & Modern American Property Law
(forthcoming in MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW).
154. See Simmons v. Norton (1831) All ER 343 (CPD) 344 (explaining that “ploughing 
meadow land and converting it into arable is prima facie waste” and “it alters the evidence 
of title”). 
155. See BEWES, supra note 20, at 9 (discussing the “merciless” application of the rule, 
including treble damages, in cases of ameliorative waste). 
156. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, § 383. 
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a product of more than one of the separate prongs of waste.  First, as 
we have already discussed, changes in the course of husbandry—if 
they rose to the level of a change in land use—would be prohibited be-
cause the land use provided evidence of title.157  Changing the course 
of husbandry could also impair either the value of the estate or the 
burdens upon it.  The common law traditionally imposed a good hus-
bandry requirement that prevented changes to the course of husband-
ry that affected value or increased burdens.158
Changing the course of husbandry could violate the good hus-
bandry standard in a variety of ways.  First, farmers understood some 
plants to be incompatible with others that might be planted there in 
the future.  For example, after being planted in woad, land would “not 
carry corn for seven years after.”159  Relying on this commonly accept-
ed principle, the plaintiff in Tresham v. Lamb160 alleged waste, in part, 
through the tenant sowing woad.  As one judge explained, woad was 
“offensive and infectious.”161  Others cases agreed, finding that woad 
was “of so poisonous a quality that it destroys the principles of vegeta-
tion.”162  Some crops were, simply put, “pernicious crops,”163 and 
waste law prohibited sowing the land with any such plant.164  As a re-
sult, the court would require “an express power in his lease”; other-
wise, the tenant would be liable for violating the covenant of good 
husbandry.165
Additionally, some agricultural techniques were likely to run afoul 
of the good husbandry rule.  English courts evaluated changes in the 
course of husbandry by inquiring into the agricultural custom of the 
area.166  This was not a matter for witness testimony as to their person-
al beliefs on the best husbandry, but rather a sense of community 
common knowledge.167  It was what “ha[s] been publicly done 
157. See supra Section III.B. 
158. While the court imposed the good husbandry requirement, it was possible for the 
parties to “contract themselves out of it.”  Tucker v. Linger (1882) 21 Ch D 18 at 24 (Eng.). 
159. BEWES, supra note 20, at 38. 
160. (1610) 123 Eng. Rep. 806, 806. 
161. Id.
162. Powis v. Dorall (1610) 8 Bacon 419. 
163. BEWES, supra note 20, at 38. 
164. REDMAN, supra note 21, at 257. 
165. Powis v. Dorall (1610) 8 Bacon 419. 
166. Tucker v. Linger (1882) 21 Ch D 18 at 24 (Eng.). 
167. Id.
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throughout the district.”168  Such a standard, the judges agreed, “must 
vary exceedingly according to soil, climate, and situation.”169  Across 
the country, there was no “uniform course of husbandry,”170 but the 
general concept of good husbandry would lay the foundation for the 
modern value-focused rule. 
3. The Boundary Maintenance Function & Shifting Land Uses
The boundary-function also explains why some English cases, in-
cluding some of the oldest, do not find waste even though there was a 
change in land use.171  In some instances parcels served multiple pur-
poses over the years, often alternating, as between pasture and mead-
ow.172  Normally, the strict rule would dictate a finding of waste when 
the tenant changed uses.  However, when the land use had already 
changed prior to the tenant taking possession, the evidence of the es-
tate was either not given through land use descriptions (but rather 
through adjoining roads, streams, etc.), or such evidence of title was 
already impaired by longstanding changes in use.  Thus, the change in 
use was not chargeable to the tenant as waste. 
In such cases, the strict per se rule173 for changing land use would 
not dictate a finding of waste; the rule only prevented changes that 
“touch[ed] the identity of the estate.”174  When the reversioner present-
ed no such evidence, the only remaining question was whether such 
land use changes offended good husbandry or reduced the value of 
168. Id.
169. Legh v. Hewitt (1803) 102 Eng. Rep. 789, 791. 
170. Id.
171. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, § 383. 
172. See Tresham v. Lamb (1610) 123 Eng. Rep. 806 (finding that, in one parcel at issue, 
the land had been pasture, but also “had been mowed and used for meadow for diverse 
years,” and therefore finding no waste with respect to that parcel when the tenant sowed 
and ploughed it). But see Fermier v. Maund (1637) 21 Eng. Rep. 524, 524 (finding that an-
cient pasture should not be plowed even though it “may have been formerly plowed,” and 
apparently relying on the designation of “ancient pasture” to refuse plowing). 
173. When land use descriptions typically determined boundaries, the courts did not 
need extensive evidence to conclude that a change in use impaired evidence of the bounda-
ries.  Thus, Chief Justice Tindal could write, “All the authorities agree in establishing the 
position, that ploughing meadow land and converting it into arable is prima facie waste. . . . 
[A]nd one of the reasons given that such an act is waste, is because it alters the evidence of 
title.”  Simmons v. Norton (1831) All ER 343 (CPD) 344.  For this reason, the court could say 
that “the ploughing up [of] ancient meadow is, upon the face of it, irreparable waste.”  
Johnson v. Goldswaine and Others (1796) 145 Eng. Rep. 1027. 
174. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, § 383. 
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the estate.175
Chief Justice Tindal, writing in Simmons v. Norton, explained the 
convergence of the two problems to create a rule against changing 
land use.176  Justice Tindal cited the fact that such changes could “al-
ter[] the evidence of title,” but also that ploughing a meadow would 
change the value of the estate because in such cases “a series of years, 
perhaps ages, must elapse, before it can be restored to its original state 
and value.”177  As Justice Tindal’s comments suggest, the boundary-
maintenance function is not to be regarded as sharply dichotomous 
from the value-maintenance function.  Maintaining boundaries effec-
tively also directly implicates value.  But the additional function of 
waste, what I am calling the boundary-maintenance function, directed 
itself specifically to preventing changes to boundaries.  Only recogniz-
ing this distinct function of waste law in maintaining boundaries ex-
plains this line of cases. 
4. The Boundary Function & Forbidding Waiver
In general, a deed or grant of an estate may prevent a tenant from 
being held liable for waste by inserting a clause granting the land 
“without impeachment of waste.”178  Both Purdy and Merrill engaged 
waste law as though it uniformly created a waivable default rule.179
Purdy described the rule as “to begin with, a default rule, always sus-
ceptible to contractual revision.”180  Yet, this is not accurate.  The 
boundary-making function of the old rule was not waivable, even by a 
specific provision that prevented impeachment for waste.181  Notably, 
English courts would not allow waiver to excuse changes of land use 
that implicated boundaries.182  Courts reasoned that, “[t]he Clause of 
without Impeachment of Waste, never was extended to allow the very 
175. Id.
176. Simmons v. Norton (1831) All ER (CPD) 344–45. 
177. Id. at 345. 
178. WILLARD, supra note 138, at 381.  This clause did not fully protect a tenant from 
liability for waste, because courts still often interfered on equity grounds to prevent waste.  
For a discussion of the reasons why courts would act in equity to prevent waste despite the 
clause, see THOMAS BRETT, LEADING CASES IN MODERN EQUITY 108–13 (J.D. Rogers & J.M. 
Dixon eds., 3d ed. 1896). 
179. PURDY, supra note 62, at 48. See generally Merrill, supra note 11.
180. PURDY, supra note 62, at 48. 
181. Id.
182. (1667) 2 Eq. Ca. ABR. 757. 
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Destruction of the Estate itself.”183  For example, the converting of “a 
pasture field into a pit or pond” was restrained by English courts, even 
if the tenant was to be held “without impeachment of waste” accord-
ing to the contract.184
By using a non-waivable waste rule, common law courts could pro-
tect more than the interests of the two parties to a suit.  Indeed, some 
cases introduce wording that suggests directly the stake of the state in 
waste cases—a move that would be logical given the boundary-
maintenance function.185  In Atkins v. Temple, the court described the 
question of waste as not just the question of whether the actions of the 
tenant were prejudicial to the reversioner, but also whether they were 
prejudicial “to the Commonwealth.”186 Atkins involved an injunction 
request to restrain the tenant “from plowing up ancient Meadow and 
Pasture Grounds.”187  Particularly given the brevity of the older Eng-
lish cases, one might consider whether the court meant that the preju-
dice to the commonwealth was some economic or other burden that 
plowing these lands would cause.  Such an alternative explanation, 
however, does not fit given the strong preference in the common law 
for arable over pasture-land.188  If the commonwealth could be preju-
diced by the tenant’s actions, it was through the destruction of the 
proper evidence of boundaries.  The fact that the strict rule was non-
waivable in the instance of injury to the evidence of title suggests that 
the rule was protecting someone besides the reversioner—potentially 
either the interest of the state in preventing property disputes or the 
interest of the neighbor in maintaining boundaries. 
Finally, making waste non-waivable when it came to the boundary 
function mirrors the strict holdings in cases of ameliorative waste, 
183. Id.
184. Findlay v. Smith, 20 Va. 134, 152 (1818) (“In the case of the Bishop of London v. 
Webb, 1 P. Wms. 527, where a tenant for years, and that too without impeachment of waste, 
contracted with brick makers to dig and work up the soil, thereby converting the pasture 
field into a pit or pond, he was [e]njoined by the Chancellor from so doing, because it did a 
lasting injury to the inheritance; and this, notwithstanding the clause of impeachment of 
waste.”). 
185. Atkins v. Temple (1625) 21 Eng. Rep. 493. 
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See BEWES, supra note 20, at 30–31 (discussing Lord Coke’s explanations of the 
common law preference for arable land over all other types); Tyrringham’s Case (1584) 76 
Eng. Rep. 973 (including Lord Coke’s footnotes about the common law preference for arable 
land).
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which are discussed in more detail below.  In cases of ameliorative 
waste, where the property changes impaired boundary evidence, 
courts dispensed treble damages, even while the reversioner profited 
from the property change.189  Such strict applications of the common 
law rule again suggest that courts were protecting a state interest as 
well as the reversioner’s interest. 
IV. A NEW HISTORY OF WASTE LAW: THE EVOLUTION TO THE MODERN
RULE IN BOTH BRITISH AND AMERICAN COURTS
Delineating boundaries through textual descriptions and land us-
age was, of course, a risky business, and one that would inevitably be 
replaced by more efficient technologies.  An accurate map meant that 
it was possible not to worry about what would later be jokingly called 
“the scandalous replacement of arable [land] by pasture.”190
Throughout the seventeenth century, colonists employed the same 
methods of marking boundaries as had been initially used in England: 
by referencing natural landmarks or landscape features and land us-
es.191  However, given that the land was not inscribed with land uses in 
the same way that parcels were in England, colonists relied much 
more heavily on landscape features as opposed to land uses.192  A 1640 
survey of Massachusetts land for William Bradford demonstrates the 
use of landscape features.193  Bradford’s land extended “from the 
bounds of Yarmouth three miles to the eastward of Naemskeckett, and 
from sea to sea, cross the said neck of land . . . and two miles to the 
western side of the said river to another place called Acqussent Riv-
er.”194  Similarly, a purchase of Newark in 1667 from native tribes was 
described as 
bounded easterly by a great creek that runs from Hack-
ingsack Bay through the salt meadow called by the In-
dians Wequahick and now known by the name of 
Bound Creek, and continuing from the head of the said 
creek to the head of a cove to a marked tree, from 
189. See BEWES, supra note 20, at 9 (discussing treble damages in cases of ameliorative 
waste). 
190. DELANO-SMITH & KAIN, supra note 126, at 117. 
191. 1 FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 258 (W. Keith 
Kavenagh ed., 1983). 
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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890 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:861 
thence it extended westerly upon a straight line, by 
computation seven miles to the same more or less, to 
the end or foot of the great mountain and to the ridge 
thereof called by the Indians Wacchung.195
Landscape features replaced land uses as the basis for written 
metes and bounds.196  Whether the description of the land was verbal 
or visual, land uses no longer provided the same social function of 
maintaining boundary lines between neighboring parcels.197  Changes 
in the scale of grants, the types of landscapes being conveyed, and the 
technology of surveying itself, which increasingly moved toward the 
visual representation of land and mathematical measurements, meant 
that waste law no longer needed to protect boundaries.198  Rather than 
engaging in more detail the story of the modernization of surveying 
methods, this Article now turns to the story of the shift in English and 
American waste law, which will allow the cases themselves to point to 
the transformations in technology. 
A. Transforming Waste Law in England
Wyndham Bewes places the turning point in English waste law at 
Huntley v. Russell, decided in 1849,199 which permitted tearing down 
195. 2 FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA, supra note 191, at 1494. 
196. See supra Section III.A. 
197. See supra Section III.A. 
198. See supra Section III.A. 
199. BEWES, supra note 20, at 130.  Bewes and his treatise summaries of English law 
were well regarded by contemporaries.  See 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 18 (2d ed. 1832) (listing Bewes among the most distinguished of English treatise writ-
ers). A contemporaneous review found that Bewes’ book “[could not] fail to be of service to 
the profession,” having “dealt exhaustively” with a topic that is both “complex and diffi-
cult.”  Review: The Law of Waste, 21 Q.J. JURIS. 95–96 (1895–96). 
American cases, including Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., the case that Merrill believes is the 
quintessential American case, rely on Bewes for the authoritative interpretation of English 
waste law.  Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 10, 79 N.W. 738, 739 (1899). 
In the early twentieth century, the other major treatise writers relied on Bewes’ work when 
discussing the law of waste.  For example, Herbert Thondike Tiffany repeatedly cites Bewes 
in his discussion of waste law.  1 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 711, 
713, 730, 737 (1912). See also EDWARD DOUGLAS ARMOUR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 93 (2d ed. 1916); JOSHUA WILLIAMS & THOMAS CYPRIAN WILLIAMS, PRINCIPLES OF 
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 115, 497 (20th ed. 1906).  Notably, even modern American cases 
still rely on Bewes when seeking an authoritative position on the traditional English rules of 
waste.  See Dodds v. Sixteenth Section Dev. Corp., 99 So. 2d 897 (Miss. 1958); Vollertsen v. 
Lamb, 732 P.2d 486, 494 (Or. 1987) (relying on Bewes to determine which parties may be 
liable for waste); State v. Delinquent Taxpayers, No. M2004-00951-COA-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. 
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and rebuilding a barn because “[t]he evidence of title could in no way 
be affected.”200  The parties argued Cole v. Greene, which had held that 
“substituting new and different buildings for old ones is waste.”201
Distinguishing that case, Justice Erle notes that in Cole, “the identity of 
the property was lost, and the evidence of the landlord’s right de-
stroyed.”202  Delivering the opinion of the court, Justice Patteson ex-
plained the ruling by saying that with respect to the three prongs of 
waste law, “one of these three requisites exists.”203  Title, the court con-
cluded, “could in no way be affected” by removing an addition to a 
house, with “that house being still standing.”204
By 1875, in Jones v. Chappell, an English court reasoned, “[y]ou may 
prove an injury in the sense of destroying identity, by what is called 
destroying evidence of the owner’s title, and that is a very peculiar 
head of the law, which has not been extended in modern times.”205
Jones concluded that the building of a new building was not per se 
waste, because the old per se rule regarding evidence of title no longer 
applied.206  Instead, the court held that the question is whether the new 
building offends either of the two remaining prongs of the waste test; 
the plaintiff must prove an injury through either a destruction of value 
or an increase in burdens.207  Citing Jones, treatise writers found that it 
was “now settled” that English courts had adopted the new rule.208
Writing in 1878 for the Court of Appeal, in Doherty v. Allman, Lord 
O’Hagan explained the change.209  Lord O’Hagan found that “owing to 
the circumstances in which property is now situated in this country, in 
Scotland, and in Ireland, evidence of title of this kind is not at all of the 
same importance as it was in other times and other circumstances.  
When you have an Ordnance Survey, when you have a Registry of 
App. LEXIS 716, *22 n.11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2006) (relying on Bewes to determine what 
conduct constitutes waste). 
200. BEWES, supra note 20, at 130 (quoting Huntley v. Russell (1849) 116 Eng. Rep. 1381 
(KB) 1387). 
201. Huntley v. Russell (1849) 116 Eng. Rep. 1381 (KB) 1387; see Greene v. Cole (1669) 
85 Eng. Rep. 1037 (KB) 1047. 
202. Huntley, 116 Eng. Rep. 1387; see Greene 85 Eng. Rep. 1037. 
203. Huntley, 116 Eng. Rep. 1388. 
204. Id.
205. BEWES, supra note 20, at 131. 
206. Id.
207. Jones v. Chappell [1875] 20 LR Eq. 539 (Eng.) 541-42. 
208. 3 EDWARDS, supra note 25, at 68. 
209. BEWES, supra, note 20, at 131–32. 
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Deeds, when you have a system of conveyancing, the value of evi-
dence of title, of a place of this sort retaining its particular position, is 
very sensibly diminished.”210  Lord Blackburn concurred, reasoning 
that 
when there are Ordnance Surveys, and where, as in Ire-
land, there is a Court especially dealing with the titles to 
estates, giving titles, and where the property is marked 
out on a map, which map can be identified with the 
Ordnance map—and these maps it may well be sup-
posed will continue to exist and may be referred to the 
end of the term—any damage in regard to evidence of 
title is quite wild and chimerical, or is at least merely 
nominal.211
Purdy has cited Meux v. Cobley, a case from 1892, to suggest that 
England still enforced the traditional common law rule, if in a rounda-
bout way, by utilizing a covenant within a lease “to avoid finding 
waste in cases of industrial development or improving buildings.”212
Others have been less pessimistic about the court’s motivations.  
Bewes, writing only a few years after the court decided Meux, inter-
preted the case as an outlier in English jurisprudence, a special case of 
“contract by which the tenant of a property, demised by words de-
scribing its character, is taken to have impliedly contracted to preserve 
its nature, as demised.”213  While Purdy concluded that the English 
courts “continued . . . to treat changes in the course of husbandry as in-
juries to the inheritance,”214  Bewes would have disagreed.  Rather 
than crediting the court with ulterior motives in Meux, Bewes looked 
to the longer line of English cases, dating back to 1849,215 and conclud-
ed that English courts had already adopted the new rule.216  Bewes 
summarizes, 
It seems fair nowadays, as a matter of arrangement, to 
treat w[aste] founded on injury to title as a possible va-
riety of trivial w[aste].  Not that there may not be, even 
210. Id.
211. Id. at 133 (quoting Doherty v. Allman [1878] 3 App. Cas. 709 (HL) 735 (Eng.) (ap-
peal taken from N. Ir.). 
212. Purdy, supra note 9, at 664 n.66. 
213. BEWES, supra note 20, at 13. 
214. Purdy, supra note 9, at 664 n.66. 
215. BEWES, supra note 20, at 130. 
216. Id.
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now, cases in which injunction may be granted or dam-
ages awarded on this ground; but that, in by far the 
largest number of instances, confusion of title is so 
slight as to be disregarded.217
Judge Kekewich, writing in the Meux decision, agreed with Bewes, 
finding that the English law had already changed.218  He described the 
transformation as “borne out by many cases,”219 including Harrow 
School v. Alderton (1800),220 Jones v. Chappell (1875),221 and Doherty v. 
Allman (1878).222  This interpretation is supported not only by Bewes’ 
distinguished treatise on The Law of Waste in England,223 but also by a 
Harvard Law Review article from 1930, which describes the shift in law 
as occurring first in England, and later, slowly in the United States.224
To a certain degree, it doesn’t perhaps even make sense to describe the 
English changes as a transformation—the English rule more properly 
simply doubled down on the part of the waste rule that had always ex-
isted and continued to be useful (the value portion of the rule), while 
setting aside the other portion of the rule (the boundary portion), 
which was made obsolete by surveying technology. 
B. The Transformation of Waste Law in America
A case called Pynchon v. Stearns signaled the shift of waste law in 
America.225  In 1846, the Massachusetts Supreme Court explained, 
“[w]hen our ancestors emigrated to this country, they brought with 
them, and were afterwards governed by, the common law of England; 
excepting, however, such parts as were inapplicable to their new con-
dition.”226  Within America “it has been the constant usage of our 
farmers to break up their grass lands for the purpose of raising crops 
217. Id. at 129–30. 
218. Meux v. Cobley [1892] 2 Ch 253 (Eng.) 263. 
219. Id.
220. 126 Eng. Rep. 1170.  Harrow involved the tenant “converting three closes of mead-
ow into garden ground.” Id. at 1170. In Harrow, the court said that “if the jury gave only one 
farthing damages for each close, the [c]ourt would give [d]efendant leave to enter up judg-
ment for himself.” Id. It appears the jury entered nominal damages. Nominal damages are 
not ordinarily available in waste actions. BEWES, supra note 20, at 130. 
221. (1875) 20 LR Eq. 539 (Eng.). 
222. (1878) 3 App. Cas. 709 (H.L.) (appeal taken from N. Ir.). 
223. BEWES, supra note 20, at 13. 
224. Liability for Ameliorative Waste, supra note 42, at 1131. 
225. Pynchon v. Stearns, 52 Mass. 304, 311 (1846). 
226. Id.
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by tillage, and laying them down again to grass, and otherwise to 
change the use and cultivation of their lands, as occasions have re-
quired.”227  Such changes were acceptable, because they were not 
“changes upon the evidence of title to lands.”228  Waste actions, pre-
venting changes to land use, were no longer necessary because “[t]he 
land conveyed is described by metes and bounds, or by some general 
and certain description of its limits, without any designation of the 
kind of land conveyed, whether it be arable land or grass land, wood 
land or cleared land, pasture or meadow.”229  Such a rule was “unsuit-
ed to wilderness conditions”230 not because industry required the cut-
ting of trees, but because in wilderness conditions land uses could not 
effectively designate boundaries. 
Despite the court’s flowery rhetoric on the American innovation, 
the court cited and directly relied upon a long-standing line of English 
cases that were in perfect agreement.  In cases dating back to the early 
1600s the English courts had held that the strict common law rule only 
prevented those changes that “touch[ed] the identity of the estate.”231
The rule had long allowed that when land historically fluctuated, there 
was no damage when the current tenant changed the use again.232  In 
Tresham v. Lamb,233 for example, the court found that where the land 
had been pasture, but also “had been mowed and used for meadow 
for diverse years,” there was no waste with respect to that parcel when 
the tenant sowed and ploughed it.  In Pynchon, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Court specifically followed this line of cases, a line that had 
long been cited in two traditional English treatises that detailed the 
rule allowing for changes in land that had been previously changed: 
John Comyn’s A Digest of the Laws of England, along with Matthew Ba-
con and Henry Gwillim’s A New Abridgement of the Law.234  The rule, 
according to Bacon and Gwillim, was that “if a meadow be sometimes 
arable, and sometimes meadow, and sometimes pasture, there, the 
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Sprankling, supra note 8, at 534. 
231. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, § 383. 
232. Id.
233. (1610) 123 Eng. Rep. 806, 806. 
234. Pynchon, 52 Mass. at 311; MATTHEW BACON & HENRY GWILLIM, A NEW
ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 252 (6th ed. 1807); JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 667 (5th ed. 1826). 
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ploughing of it is not waste.”235  Comyn’s treatise similarly finds that 
where the use of land has changed “where it was sometimes pasture, 
and sometimes arable,” there is no waste.236  The argument that Justice 
Wilde makes in his Pynchon opinion, relies directly on this longstand-
ing rule: changes only counted as waste if they “touch[ed] the identity 
of the estate.”237  Where the land use fluctuated, it could not be the 
source of the identity of the estate; there was no reason to punch an-
other change in land use as waste.  In Pynchon, this is precisely Justice 
Wilde’s reasoning: the strict rule against land use changes didn’t apply 
to the American wilderness because metes and bounds instead of land 
uses delineated boundaries.238  Rather than elaborating a new rule, 
Pynchon endorsed one dating back centuries in English jurisprudence. 
A second influential case closely followed Pynchon.  In 1850, the 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island followed the Massachusetts exam-
ple.239  In Clemence v. Steere, the court found: 
The defendant is charged with having converted mead-
ow into pasture land.  In England this would be waste.  
But we are not to apply the English law too strictly.  
Our lands are in many respects cultivated differently 
from land in England; and this difference is to be taken 
into account.  Here it is necessary to show that the 
change is detrimental to the inheritance and contrary to 
the ordinary course of good husbandry.  If in this case 
the change injured the farm, or was such a change as no 
good farmer would make, it was waste.240
Additionally, the court failed to award any damages for waste 
when the defendant tore down a house that was alleged “not to be 
reparable, or so dilapidated that the expense of repairing would be be-
yond the value of the house.”241  The court did find that “[w]hatever 
may have been its value, the reversioner had a right to it,”242 but no 
damages were awarded for razing the house.243
235. MATTHEW BACON & HENRY GWILLIM, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 252 (6th 
ed. 1807). 
236. JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 667 (5th ed. 1826). 
237. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, § 383. 
238. Pynchon, 52 Mass. at 311. 
239. Clemence v. Steere, 1 R.I. 272 (1850) 
240. Id. at 274. 
241. Id. at 276. 
242. Id.
243. See id. at 277. 
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The Missouri Supreme Court re-evaluated the traditional waste 
rule in 1860: the court held that it was not “waste in this country to 
convert arable land into meadow.”244  This conclusion came from the 
court reasoning that “cutting timber and clearing land may, so far 
from being waste, often enhance the value of the inheritance.”245  This 
did not mean, however, that changing the course of husbandry would 
never be waste.  The court continued the traditional good husbandry 
standard, finding that, “there is a due and reasonable medium to be 
observed according to the custom of farmers.  To cut down all the tim-
ber on a tract of land and sell it would be waste because it would be 
detrimental to the inheritance.”246
Cannon v. Barry, a Mississippi Supreme Court case from 1881, con-
cluded that the English law was “inapplicable” to the new American 
context.247  While the court does not explain exactly what makes the 
rule inexplicable, the attorney’s arguments from the case demonstrate 
how the boundary function of English waste law was not needed in 
America.248  The attorney explains that, “[t]he common law doctrine 
that anything is waste which impairs the evidence of title, as drawing 
in fences, has no application in this country, where the lands are de-
scribed by land-office numbers.”249  In Cannon, the defendant had 
cleared thirty to forty acres, and in doing so he “freely cut and used 
the growing timber on the place, of which there is a superabundance 
for this and all other purposes.”250  The court concluded that the de-
fendant “has unquestionably been guilty of that which would be 
deemed waste under the English authorities, but which we cannot 
pronounce to be such under the state of things existing with us, and 
under the circumstances of this case.”251  The court reasoned that “[t]he 
condition of this country and that of England are wholly dissimilar, 
and that which would be a safe test there is altogether inapplicable 
here.”252  In England, the very changing of the use of land from wood-
land to arable would have been, unquestionably, waste.  It would have 
244. Proffitt v. Henderson, 29 Mo. 325, 327–28 (1860). 
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Cannon v. Barry, 59 Miss. 289, 303 (1881). 
248. Id. at 297, 303. 
249. Id. at 298. 
250. Id. at 303. 
251. Id.
252. Id.
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been perhaps the safest of tests for waste.  As the attorney argued 
though, the rule was no longer necessary where land boundaries were 
precisely recorded.253
In 1888, in Hubble v. Cole,254 the Virginia Supreme Court considered 
a case involving the erection of a new building and a potential change 
in the course of husbandry.  While the court was unsure based on the 
evidence if there truly was a change in the course of husbandry, the 
court did not even consider applying the traditional rule forbidding 
changes outright, which would have been non-waivable.255
In 1903, Tiffany’s treatise Real Property finds that “[i]n former times, 
some acts were regarded as waste merely because they changed the 
appearance of the land, and so impaired the evidence of title thereto, 
but, with the adoption of improved methods of identifying land, this 
can no longer be regarded as waste.”256  Tiffany cites both Melms and 
Pynchon, among other cases.257  By 1920, Tiffany’s treatise speaks all the 
more firmly of this change.258  Tiffany described the old rule, saying 
that the reason for the rule was that a change in husbandry “ren-
der[ed] the proof of title more difficult.”259  Tiffany describes this rea-
son as “inapplicable in this country” because “land is almost invaria-
bly, at the present day, described by metes and bounds or courses and 
distances, or by reference to a plat or survey, and not by its particular 
character.”260
C. The Transformation of Waste Law in America: Treatise Formalization
As these cases demonstrate, while later courts at times simply par-
roted the precedents, earlier American decisions explained their logic 
in terms of the demise of one prong of the waste rule: the boundary-
maintenance function.  Treatise authors recognized the same reasoning 
for the change. 
Writing in 1894, Wyndham Anstis Bewes composed a thorough 
253. Id. at 297. 
254. 7 S.E. 242 (1888). 
255. Id.
256. HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND OTHER INTERESTS 
IN LAND § 247 (1903). 
257. Id. § 247 n.175. 
258. 1 TIFFANY, supra note 41, at 954.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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treatise on the law of waste.261  Bewes explained old and new rules of 
waste and their history of adoption in England as well as the United 
States.262  Notably, Bewes dates both English and American adoptions 
of the new rule to roughly the same time period.263  Bewes cites the 
“turn of the tide” in England as 1849, with Huntley v. Russell.264 Hunt-
ley involved the tearing down of a barn and building of another in a 
different location (“a mile away”).265  The court concluded that this 
was not waste, because “[t]he evidence of title could in no way be af-
fected.”266
When Bewes considered American case law, he determined that 
American courts were also adopting the new rule.  Bewes cited Pyn-
chon v. Stearns and Clemence v. Steere as the leading American cases that 
break with the English common law tradition,267 thus placing the shift 
in the United States at the mid-1800s. 
Most other treatise writers were less thorough in their discussions, 
and therefore less specific in placing the date of transformation.  They 
were, however, clear that the new rule was well ensconced by the turn 
of the twentieth century.  Charles Theodore Boone, writing in 1901, 
found that waste law in the United States depended on determining 
the change in the property’s value through the good husbandry stand-
ard.268  Writing in 1910, Minor detailed the American adoption of the 
new rule.269  Minor explained that as for changes in land use “touching 
the identity of the estate,” this “reason would be generally of little 
weight in the United States.”270  Blakemore, writing in 1917, explained 
that the original waste rule prevented changes in land use because 
such usages gave “evidences of title.”271  Blakemore concluded that 
American courts had largely abandoned this rule.272  Blakemore noted 
that the old rule was unnecessary “on account of our system of deeds 
261. BEWES, supra note 20. 
262. Id. at 18–30, 130–38. 
263. Id. at 29–30, 130. 
264. Id. at 130 (citing Huntley v. Russell (1849) 116 Eng. Rep. 1381 (KB)). 
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 29–30. 
268. 1 BOONE, supra note 23, at 307. 
269. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, § 383. 
270. Id.
271. BLAKEMORE, supra note 23, at 327. 
272. Id.
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and registries of deeds.”273
D. The Transformation of Waste Law in America: Understanding the Shift
This new history of waste law departs from previous accounts in 
two key ways.  First, while traditional accounts have maintained that 
the shift was a radical American break with British tradition, the new 
history describes a shift that is parallel in both countries.  The new his-
tory concludes that there is little reason to think of the new rule as dis-
tinctively American.  Second, the new history disputes the traditional 
account of transformation as fueled by the pressures of land develop-
ment.  Rather, this new history explains how both British and Ameri-
can courts shifted to adopt the new rule when the old one’s strict 
boundary maintenance function was made obsolete by technological 
developments.  This Section discusses each of these two key points in 
further detail. 
First, to examine the new rule and illuminate its consistencies with 
both the original common law rule and the modern British rule, it is 
appropriate to begin with the concept of ameliorative waste.  Amelio-
rative waste lies at the heart of the change.  Under the old rule, amelio-
rative waste was forbidden; under the new rule it is permissible.274
The strict rule against ameliorative waste emerged directly from a fear 
of a tenant destroying evidence of title.275  As Young v. Spencer ex-
plained, “A tenant has no right to make any alteration to the demised 
premises; not even that which may improve their value, if such an al-
teration will affect the evidence of the landlord’s title,” thus potentially 
causing a difficulty in afterwards proving the identity of the premis-
es.276  It was this one prong—evidence of title—of the three-prong 
waste test that made adding positive value punishable when the ten-
ant’s actions otherwise passed the remaining prongs.277  If, on the other 
273. Id.
274. See supra Sections IV.B, IV.C. 
275. See Young v. Spencer (1829) 109 Eng. Rep. 405 (KB). 
276. Id.
277. “To pull down a house and rebuild it less than before is certainly waste; and it 
seems at common law to be no less waste to rebuild it greater than before, because, it is 
said, it is to the prejudice of the owner of the inheritance, for it is more charge to repair! A 
better reason is that the consequent alteration in the description of the premises might im-
pair the evidence of the owner’s title. Indeed, Lord Coke holds it to be waste even to build a 
new house where there was none before. But in England, at least, this seems to be no longer 
the rule if the value of the land has been increased by the rebuilding—a doctrine much 
more conformable to modern ideas of justice and reason.” MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, 
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hand, the alteration increased the value of the property, under the old 
rule the next question was for the jury to determine: whether the 
change damaged the reversioner’s ability to prove the boundaries.278
This is because it may be an act which would increase the value of the 
estate, yet be injurious to the inheritance, as it may impair the evidence 
of title.279  When there was no problem with impairing the evidence of 
title, ameliorative waste need not be punished under the remaining 
two prongs.280  If the tenant “pulled down a barn,” it was not waste, if 
the jury find that the premises are not damaged.281
Indeed, the two functions of waste law—boundary-maintenance 
and value-maintenance—explain some otherwise anomalous results.  
Not all common law cases held that it was waste to erect new build-
ings;282 logically, such acts did not have to constitute waste.  If they 
added value to the property and did not overburden it, and the prop-
erty was not designated in title by the location or function of the build-
ings, then new buildings might have no impact on the evidence of ti-
tle.283  In such cases, ameliorating waste would not have offended the 
three-pronged common law test.284  Such reasoning of the English 
courts allowed tenants to construct temporary buildings that were 
placed on stilts or rocks, so long as they were “removable at will” and 
“not fixed into the ground.”285
English courts specifically connected their omission of the bounda-
ry-maintenance prong of waste to their acceptance of ameliorating 
waste.  Having no need for waste law to maintain boundaries, English 
courts determined “nowadays, as a matter of arrangement, to treat 
w[aste] founded on injury to title as a possible variety of trivial 
w[aste].”286  Then, “[i]t follows by an a fortiori argument that if a tenant 
be not punishable for trivial w[aste], neither is he for meliorating, and 
this is established by abundance of authority.”287  Others have fol-
§ 381 (internal citations omitted). 
278. Young v. Spencer (1829) 109 Eng. Rep. 405 (KB). 
279. Doe v. Burlington (1833) 110 ER 878 (KB). 
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. BEWES, supra note 20, at 138–39. 
283. Huntley v. Russell 116 Eng. Rep. 1381 (KB) 1381. 
284. Id. at 1388. 
285. Id. at 1382. 
286. BEWES, supra note 20, at 129–30. 
287. Id. at 134. 
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lowed this approach, connecting the strict common law rule with the 
rule against “even ameliorative changes.”288  In Barret v. Barret, the 
court found that the only way for waste to exist is for it to be prejudi-
cial to the inheritance.289  Expounding on this premise, the Court of 
King’s Bench in Cole v. Greene found that for an act to be injurious to 
the inheritance, it must do so by one of three ways: “by diminishing 
the value of the estate, or, secondly by increasing the burthen upon it, 
or, thirdly, by impairing the evidence of title.”290  The court then de-
termined that in the case of pulling down old buildings and replacing 
them with new ones, if “the value of the reversion might be increased 
by the alteration; it was, therefore, a question for the jury” as to 
whether waste occurred.291  If the court omitted the issue of evidence 
of the title, the common law rule simply became the two remaining 
factors: increase of burden on the property or diminishment the value 
of the estate. 
American courts followed the same approach, omitting the bound-
ary-maintenance prong and keeping the other two.292  American courts 
omitted the boundary-maintenance prong for precisely the same rea-
son as the English courts: it was increasingly superfluous given the 
technical and professional developments in surveying and the registra-
tion of deeds.293
A second point on which the new account would disagree with 
traditional narratives is the idea that the change was fueled by the 
need to develop land.  Horwitz, Sprankling, and Purdy’s accounts 
share a common approach: each cites development pressures to ex-
plain the origins of that rule.294  As an initial point, each explanation 
assumes—incorrectly—that American courts were doing something 
distinct that was a great contrast to the approach of British courts.  
Sprankling, for example, argued that American judges were 
288. Liability for Ameliorative Waste, supra note 42, at 1130. 
289. Greene v. Cole 85 Eng. Rep. 1037 (KB). 
290. Id. at 1047. 
291. Id.
292. See generally HORTWITZ, supra note 6, at 54–55; Sprankling, supra note 8, at 533–35; 
Purdy, supra note 9. 
293. See generally HORTWITZ, supra note 6, at 54–55; Sprankling, supra note 8, at 533–35; 
Purdy, supra note 9. 
294. HORTWITZ, supra note 6, at 54–55; Sprankling, supra note 8, at 533; Purdy, supra
note 9. 
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“creat[ing] a uniquely American jurisprudence.”295  As we have seen, 
little evidence supports this idea.  Setting this aside, however, there are 
other reasons to doubt the development-fueled narrative. 
Recall that Horwitz used waste law as a primary example of a larg-
er trend in American law, the transformation of law to foster economic 
development.296  Sprankling found that American courts “merely 
eroded the traditional rule; melding rationales based on economic ne-
cessity and presumed owner intent.”297  As for the American change, 
Purdy
contend[s] that U.S. courts refashioned the English law 
of waste for several reasons: to promote efficient use of 
resources that the English law would have inhibited; to 
advance an idea of American landholding as a republi-
can enterprise, free of feudal hierarchy; and because of a 
belief that the cultivation of wild land underlay the An-
glo-American claim to North America.298
The traditional narrative of jettisoning the English law at the Amer-
ican Revolution in favor of a more development-friendly rule that al-
lowed timber cutting has often relied on rhetoric from cases that de-
scribed the English rule as “inapplicable” or no longer fitted to the 
“new country.” Sprankling cited courts that described the English rule 
as “wholly inapplicable”299 and instead found that the English rule had 
to be “varied and accommodated to our new and comparatively unset-
tled country.”300  While indeed some American cases cite the economic 
need to cultivate land as a reason for adjusting the English rule, many 
of the cases describing the English rule as “inapplicable” rely on Pyn-
chon v. Stearns, which, as previously discussed, specifically rejected the 
English rule because it no longer served the boundary-maintenance 
function.301 Drown v. Smith, for example, adopted the new American 
rule in Maine, finding the English rule “inapplicable to this country” 
and relying on Pynchon.302
Waste actions, preventing changes to land use, were no longer nec-
295. Sprankling, supra note 8, at 522. 
296. HORTWITZ, supra note 6, at 54. 
297. Sprankling, supra note 8, at 536. 
298. PURDY, supra note 62, at 46–47. 
299. Sprankling, supra note 8, at 535. 
300. Id. at 536. 
301. Pynchon v. Stearns, 52 Mass. 304, 311 (1846). 
302. Drown v. Smith, 52 Me. 141, 144 (1862). 
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essary because “[t]he land conveyed is described by metes and 
bounds, or by some general and certain description of its limits, with-
out any designation of the kind of land conveyed, whether it be arable 
land or grass land, wood land or cleared land, pasture or meadow.”303
Or, as the attorney in Cannon v. Barry noted, “The common law doc-
trine that anything is waste which impairs the evidence of title, as 
drawing in fences, has no application in this country, where the lands 
are described by land-office numbers.”304  Tiffany’s treatise, The Law of 
Real Property and Other Interests in Land summarized the adoption of 
the new rule, explaining that “[i]n former times, some acts were re-
garded as waste merely because they changed the appearance of the 
land, and so impaired the evidence of title thereto, but, with the adop-
tion of improved methods of identifying land, this can no longer be re-
garded as waste.”305  Where “land is almost invariably, at the present 
day, described by metes and bounds or courses and distances, or by 
reference to a plat or survey, and not by its particular character,”306
there is no need for a strict rule prohibiting changes in land use be-
cause they impaired evidence of title.  Minor explained in his treatise 
on property law that, as for changes in land use “touching the identity 
of the estate,” this “reason [for punishing a change of land use] would 
be generally of little weight in the United States.”307  With respect to 
the changes in technology, Minor noted, “lands are commonly de-
scribed by metes and bounds, and seldom by the character which they 
happen to have at the time, as arable, pasture, etc.”308
In Melms, when the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the modern 
rule, the court specifically noted that the old rule served a purpose in 
law that was no longer administratively or scientifically necessary.309
When it came to impairing the evidence of title, it had been “a cogent 
and persuasive [rule] in former times,” but with modernization, it 
“ha[d] lost most, if not all, of its force . . . .”310 The rule was no longer 
needed in a world with “accurate surveys and the establishment of the 
303. Pynchon, 52 Mass. at 311. 
304. Cannon v. Barry, 59 Miss. 289, 297 (1881). 
305. TIFFANY, supra note 256, at 560. 
306. 1 TIFFANY, supra note 41, at 954. 
307. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, § 383. 
308. Id.
309. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 12, 79 N.W. 738, 739 (1899). 
310. Id.
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system of recording conveyances.”311  In such a context, when it came 
to changes on the physical landscape, the court concluded that “there 
can be few acts which will impair any evidence of title.”312  Like the 
English courts, American courts no longer needed waste law to per-
form the boundary-maintenance function.  New technologies and pro-
fessional surveyors, along with deed registration systems, performed 
this function and did so with greater accuracy.  The American courts, 
like the English courts, had determined to dispense with the prong of 
the waste test that maintained boundaries. 
Sprankling has argued that the good husbandry standard was cho-
sen by the American courts, making a break with English courts, pri-
marily to advance land development.313  But the evidence here shows 
that by relying on the two remaining prongs of the old rule, American 
courts maintained significant continuities with older British cases, be-
ginning with their use of the good husbandry standard.  Indeed, “good 
husbandry” became the operative phrase for the new rule.  As previ-
ously discussed, British cases applied a standard of “due and husband-
like management” to determine whether waste occurred.314  Because 
good husbandry provided evidence of damage to the property’s val-
ue—one of the two central prongs of waste—courts invoked this im-
plied standard even in negotiated contracts such as agricultural leas-
es315 and even without specific covenants.316  Courts implied a rule that 
a tenant was “bound to manage his agricultural land in a husband-like 
way according to the custom of the country.”317  The good husbandry 
standard was not a new invention for the English courts, but rather 
one that dated to the oldest cases on waste.318 Maleverer v. Spinke 
(1538) found that while the tenant could not “convert land into wood, 
or wood into arable land,” he could “root up bushes, furze, and thorns 
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Purdy summarizes Sprankling’s approach as “contend[ing] that an ‘instrumental-
ist’ view of the natural world, coupled with a perceived imperative to bring the new conti-
nent under the ax and plow, led to the good husbandry standard, which allowed tenants to 
clear and develop land in the interests of advancing cultivation.” PURDY, supra note 62, at 
46.
314. YOOL, supra note 23, at 8; BEWES, supra note 20, at 12–13. 
315. BEWES, supra note 20, at 13. 
316. Id. at 32. 
317. Id.
318. Id. at 131–34. 
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growing upon the land, for melioration, for that is good husbandry.”319
Like the American courts, the English courts continued after the 
rule change to use the good husbandry standard to evaluate value 
changes.  For example, in Hubble v. Cole, the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant was “plowing up 80 or 90 acres of river bottom,” and that it 
“would require the same to be mowed or grazed, and not cultivated 
for gain crops,” and additionally that “this land lies immediately in the 
middle fork of Holston river, and, in times of high water, is subject to 
overflow, and, if plowed three years in succession, in all probability 
would be injured by floods and water beyond estimate and beyond 
reparation.”320  In such circumstances, good husbandry indicated that 
the value of the land had been damaged by the acts of the tenant.321
Good husbandry went hand in hand with value change, which had 
always been one of the quintessential means of proving waste under 
English common law.322  It continued to be so under the new rule both 
in England and in America. 
Given that land use conditions varied greatly between the two 
countries, the development-driven narrative endorsed by Horwitz, 
Sprankling, and Purdy fails to account very effectively for the strong 
consistency between the English and American shifts.  On the other 
hand, both jurisdictions similarly experienced the changes that oc-
curred through the professionalization and modernization of survey-
ing, along with the creation of accurate legal mechanisms for recording 
boundary and title details. 
V. THE NEW HISTORY AND THE TIMING OF THE DOCTRINAL SHIFT
Horwitz found that American waste law by 1820 “bore only the 
faintest resemblance” to the law before the Revolution.323  Temporally, 
he specifically locates the catalyst as “the moment of independence 
from England.”324  Sprankling, similarly, contrasts an English rule with 
an American law whose emergence he places around the time of the 
319. Quoted in BEWES, supra note 20, at 134. 
320. Hubble v. Cole, 7 S.E. 242, 242 (1888). In this case, the court applied not the Eng-
lish common law regarding good husbandry generally, but rather interpreted a provision in 
the lease which provided that “the lands shall be farmed in a way to prevent injury to the 
same.” Id. at 243. 
321. Id. at 244–45. 
322. YOOL, supra note 23, at 2. 
323. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 30. 
324. Id. at 54. 
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Revolution.325  Purdy separates the English and American adoption of 
the new rule, saying that the English change “came for quite distinct 
reasons, and long after American law had completed its break from 
English doctrine.”326  Additionally, Purdy’s contrast of the American 
and English rules and construction of the civic republic narrative sug-
gests that the American doctrine did, in fact, shift with or near the 
American Revolution.327
Only a couple of early cases, such as Jackson v. Brownson, on which 
Purdy substantially relies,328 consider deviating from the English 
rule.329  Those cases are not only limited to a couple of jurisdictions, 
but also, as the New Hampshire Supreme Court observes, to circum-
stances where the court is interpreting a contract, in particular a short 
term lease of undeveloped land.330  Rather than concluding that other 
jurisdictions had wholly “jettisoned” the English law, as Sprankling 
would have us believe, the New Hampshire court saw a much more 
mediated response from the American courts.331  Short term leases 
provided a very specific context—one where it was illogical for the les-
see to anticipate making a financial gain from the land unless he could 
either cut timber or clear land for cultivation.  Logically, “[i]f lands are 
leased to a lessor in an uncultivated state, he must of necessity have 
the power to clear; otherwise, the lease would be of no profit or ad-
vantage to him.”332  Moreover, such circumstances were analogous to 
the English rule that allowed for a tenant to work open mines even if 
they were not mentioned within a lease—the need for economic gain 
from the lease was inferred.333  If a tenant intended to live on the un-
325. Sprankling, supra note 8, at 534–35. 
326. Purdy, supra note 9, at 664–65. 
327. See id. at 668. 
328. Id. at 661. Purdy describes Jackson v. Brownson as the “watershed” case in Ameri-
can waste law. 
329. Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns. 227, 336 (N.Y. 1810). 
330. Chase v. Hazelton, 7 N.H. 171, 177–78 (1834). 
331. Id.
332. Ward v. Sheppard, 3 N.C. 283 (1803). 
333. Findlay v. Smith, 20 Va. 134, 143 (1818). While one judge, Judge Cabell, spoke of 
the need to accommodate waste law “to the situation of our new and unsettled country,” he 
made this statement specifically in the context of acknowledging that the English rule al-
ready “varies and accommodates itself to the varying wants and situations of the different 
counties in that country” rather than announcing a great break with the common law. Id. at 
142. Even at that, Judge Cabell’s comments appears to be primarily dicta; he makes his deci-
sion not so much based on the law of waste, but rather by focusing on the intent of the tes-
tator. Id. at 146. 
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developed land during the lease, then the tenant had a reasonable ex-
pectation to be able to clear enough land “for the necessary support of 
his family.”334  Still, only a handful of such cases exist; the majority of 
jurisdictions applied the strict English rule well beyond the turn of the 
century. 
As for Jackson v. Brownson, rather than seeing a watershed case, as 
Purdy argues, the New Hampshire Supreme Court saw the holding in 
Jackson as limited to the circumstances of a lease of undeveloped 
land.335  As a potential watershed case for American law, Jackson has a 
more problematic flaw: In Jackson v. Brownson the parties agreed that 
the lease contemplated clearing land, leaving the only question as 
whether the tenant “committed waste thereon by clearing and drain-
ing off the land more than a reasonable and due proportion of the 
wood.”336  As a result, the question of whether or not the law of New 
York would find the clearing of undeveloped land to be waste would 
was not properly before the court in Jackson.337  This, perhaps, explains 
why so few decisions later cite or rely on Jackson; this also explains the 
lack of the trail of subsequent citations that one would expect from a 
watershed case. 
Most importantly, there is significant evidence that the strict com-
mon law rule thrived long after these two cases.  As of 1935, Alabama 
courts affirmed the English rule, and described their holding as in con-
formity with the majority of jurisdictions: “many authorities, both Eng-
lish and American, declare that such changes will be deemed waste, 
even though the value of the property would be enhanced by the al-
teration.”338  Similarly, as of 1836, Massachusetts followed the old 
rule.339  The tenant had “no right to cut growing trees, that such cutting 
would be waste, and that wild and uncultivated land cannot 
be deemed estate yielding annual rents or profits.”340
Closer to the middle of the century, Alabama still retained the Eng-
lish rule, applying it to prevent a change in building uses.  Alabama 
recognized that 
334. Parkins v. Coxe, 3 N.C. 517 (1805). 
335. Chase, 7 N.H. at 178. 
336. Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns. 227 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810). 
337. Id. at 237. 
338. Senteney v. United Embroidery Co., 159 So. 252, 255 (Ala. 1935). 
339. White v. Cutler, 17 Pick. 248, 250 (Mass. 1836). 
340. Id.
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[i]t is an old principle of the common law, that a tenant 
is guilty of waste, if he materially changes the nature 
and character of the building leased.  Thus, it is held, 
that he cannot convert a corn-mill into a fulling-mill, or 
a water-mill into a wind-mill, or a log-wood-mill into a 
cotton-mill, or a dwelling-house into a warehouse, or a 
brewhouse into an office.341
Indiana applied the traditional English rule through 1876, limiting 
the right of a tenant to take timber to only what was necessary for re-
pairs.342
To see how long the old rule persisted beyond the American Revo-
lution, it is important to look past the few published cases on waste to 
the more robust litigation on dower rules.  This line of cases demon-
strates fidelity to the old rule, continuing well after the American Rev-
olution and through the nineteenth century.343
Dower cases often incorporated the traditional waste rules to de-
termine the rights of widows to wilderness lands.  For example, in 
1818 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided Conner v. 
Shepherd, determining whether or not a widow was entitled to a dower 
right within wild or uncultivated land owned by her husband.344  The 
court concluded that she did not, relying primarily on the fact that 
waste law, as it traditionally existed in the English common law, 
would apply to the case.345  The court concluded that it was a needless 
limit on the estate to give the widow a dower right in wild lands be-
cause she would be able to do nothing with the land and to draw no 
income from it because of the application of waste laws.346  The court 
reasoned that “her estate, would be forfeited if she were to cut down 
any of the trees valuable as timber.”347  Similarly, “[i]t would seem too 
that the mere change of the property from wilderness to arable or pas-
ture land, by cutting down the wood and clearing up the land, might 
be considered as waste.”348  The court specifically cited the traditional 
341. Parkman’s Adm’r v. Aicardi & Tool, 34 Ala. 393, 396 (1859). 
342. Miller v. Shields, 55 Ind. 71, 75 (1876). 
343. See generally, e.g., Conner v. Shepherd, 15 Mass. 164, 167 (1818); Webb v. Town-
send, 18 Mass. 21, 22 (1822); Ford v. Erskine, 50 Me. 227, 230 (1862). 
344. Conner, 15 Mass. at 167. 
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
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rule of not changing land uses, but did not apply it for the purpose of 
maintaining boundaries.349  Instead, the court reasoned that the land 
use rule existed to prevent changes in the property because “even if it 
became thereby more valuable, [it] would subject the estate in dower 
to forfeiture: the heir having a right to the inheritance, in the same 
character as it was left by the ancestor.”350
In 1836 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court again considered 
the issue and affirmed Conner v. Shepherd, although noting that for the 
purposes of dower land it applied only to wild or uncultivated 
lands.351  The court explained that there was no “dower in wild and 
uncultivated lands” because such lands “yield no annual profit, and 
secondly, because the widow could not make the only beneficial use of 
them, of which they are capable, without committing waste and for-
feiting the estate.”352  Following Horwitz, Sprankling, and Purdy, one 
might expect that the rule would shift soon after the revolutionary pe-
riod, but in fact it did not.  Nearly a century later, Massachusetts fol-
lowed the same rule.353
Massachusetts was not alone in relying on traditional English 
waste law to determine the extent of dower rights.  As the Maine Su-
preme Court explained in 1862, the old waste rule was retained by 
statute, and thus “a widow shall not be endowed of wild lands of 
which her husband died seized.”354  The court noted that “[t]his has 
long been the settled law of this State and of Massachusetts.”355  In 
maintaining this dower standard, Maine followed Massachusetts’ rea-
soning based on the English law of waste.  According to the Maine Su-
349. Id. at 164–67. 
350. Id. at 167. 
351. White v. Cutler, 34 Mass. 248, 250–51 (Mass. 1836). The court limited its ruling ex-
plaining that, “These reasons apply as well to the case of a woodlot situated in the midst of 
a cultivated country, as to forest lands in their original state. But the chief justice, in deliver-
ing the opinion of the Court in this case, takes care in terms to limit its operation to the case 
of woodlands not used or connected with a cultivated farm, or other improved estate.” Id.
352. Id. at 250; Webb v. Townsend, 18 Mass. 21, 22 (1822). 
353. The question, then, when determining dower rights was whether or not the piece 
of land was accurately described as wild and uncultivated. Goodspeed v. Lawrence, 208 
Mass. 258, 260 (1911) (“The finding of the single justice that the widow can occupy the lands 
here in question without committing waste does not mean, as the appellant contends, that 
the widow can occupy but cannot improve these lots without committing waste. It is plain 
that they can be improved without committing waste, and that the single justice so found. It 
follows that they are not wild land within R.L. c. 132, § 3.”). 
354. Ford v. Erskine, 50 Me. 227, 230 (1862). 
355. Id. 
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preme Court, “[t]he reason for this rule is, that dower being an estate 
for life only, woodland can be of no practicable value to the tenant in 
dower, as it cannot be improved nor the wood cut off by her without 
liability for waste.”356
New Hampshire courts similarly concluded, “[t]he right of dower 
is limited to lands ‘in a state of cultivation;’ because a life estate in 
lands in a state of nature would generally be worthless, the tenant for 
life being subject to trespass and waste, if she cut down wood and 
timber for the purposes of sale or cultivation.”357
As of 1867, the Supreme Court of Georgia still applied the tradi-
tional rule.  Indeed, the court relied on Lord Coke, affirming that a 
“tenant-for-life may cut timber trees, (that is, trees twenty years of 
age,) at seasonable times, for the repairing of the houses or fences on 
the land.”358  Additionally, the life tenant may use dead wood for 
fuel.359  To go beyond these two uses, however, was waste, because 
“[a]ll timber belongs to the remainder man.”360  The Georgia court not-
ed that such restrictions had been removed in some of the American 
states, such as New York, but found that within Georgia, “these com-
mon law doctrines have not been altered by any legislative enactment, 
and are therefore obligatory on the [c]ourts.”361
In 1884, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the dower rules 
from multiple states, reviewing those that did and did not apply the 
English rule of waste to determine which lands were subject to dower 
rights.362  Wisconsin, ultimately, did not prefer the English rule, but al-
so did not dismiss it outright without considering the weight of the 
states maintaining that rule.363  Multiple jurisdictions, long after the 
American Revolution and into the twentieth century, relied on the 
English rule of waste in establishing dower rights.364
356. Id.
357. Johnson v. Perley, 2 N.H. 56, 59 (1819). 
358. Dickinson v. Jones, 36 Ga. 97, 104 (1867). 
359. Id. at 105. 
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 59 Wis. 557, 561, 18 N.W. 527, 529 (1884). 
363. Id. at 560. Wisconsin adopts the modern American standard of considering the 
overall value of the property and the rule of good husbandry: “[i]t is not waste for the life 
tenant to cut down wood or timber, so as to fit the land for cultivation or pasture, provided 
this does not damage or diminish the value of the inheritance, and is conformable to the 
rules of good husbandry.” Id. at 561. 
364. One might interpret Pennsylvania as a jurisdiction that in earlier years rejected 
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Cases interpreting wills and deeds provide another source of in-
formation on American courts applying the old rule, at least through 
the first few decades after the Revolution.  One of the traditional 
quandaries of interpreting estate language is determining when the 
author intended to create a life estate versus a fee simple.  The general 
rule has been to require words of inheritance to create a fee simple; the 
overall rule of interpretation, however, has been the author’s intent to 
benefit the devisee.365
Courts in multiple jurisdictions, relying on the incorporation of the 
English rule of waste into their state common law, used waste law to 
illuminate the intent.  Courts reasoned that “a devise of wild and un-
cultivated land carried a fee without any words of inheritance;—
because a life estate would be of no use to the devisee.”366  Because of 
the rules of waste, courts reasoned that a life estate in wild, uncultivat-
ed lands was “worthless.”367  Given that “[a] devise is always intended 
for the benefit of the party,”368 the author must intend something more 
than a life estate.  The court concluded, “[t]he inference then is clear, 
that a devise of such land, without words of inheritance, carries a 
fee.”369  Like the dower cases, these will cases demonstrate the continu-
ing importance of the traditional English rule. 
When it comes to dating the shift from this rule, Merrill opposed 
Horwitz, Sprankling, and Purdy, dating the rule change to nearer the 
twentieth century, to the Melms case, which he describes as “the cata-
lytic decision that began the process of remaking the doctrine in this 
fashion.”370  Merrill argues that “[t]he real transformation in the Amer-
ican law of waste occurred not in the nineteenth century, but in the 
the British rule in dower cases. In Hastings v. Crunckleton, the court allowed the widow to 
clear lands. However, it appears from the circumstances that the widow received only un-
cultivated lands in her common law division and therefore to have any support from the 
lands, which she could not sell, she would have had to clear some area for cultivation. 3 
Yeates 261 (1801). Such reasoning by the courts seems more an exception to the general rule 
rather than the adoption of a new one. 
365. In general, a devise “without words of inheritance” is one for life only. Sargent v. 
Towne, 10 Mass. 303, 307 (1813). However, “[a] devise is always intended for the benefit of 
the party.” Id.
366. Babb v. Perley, 1 Me. 6, 8–9 (1820). 
367. Sargent, 10 Mass. at 307. 
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1084. 
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912 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:861 
twentieth.”371  And Merrill has not been the only person to regard 
Melms as the landmark case.372  Merrill argues “Before Melms, all courts 
would have regarded the deliberate destruction of a house to be waste.  
Indeed, any material alteration of property by someone temporarily in 
possession was regarded as waste.”373
As we have seen, a number of American cases through the nine-
teenth century adopted the new rule, omitting the boundary-
maintenance prong and leaving the waste rule with only the two val-
ue-maintenance prongs.374  So why does Merrill not see a shift until af-
ter Melms?  Merrill argued that the cases cited by Horwitz, Purdy, and 
Sprankling all involved agricultural cultivation.375  Merrill does not see 
these cases as evidence of the new rule being applied because he main-
tains that courts would have reached the same outcome under the old 
rule, and argues that it was “not clear that there was any real differ-
ence between English and American law on [agricultural cultivation 
371. Id. at 1080. 
372. Thomas Merrill describes Melms as potentially “the most important decision ever 
rendered by an American court concerning the law of waste.”  Id. at 1055; see also Deepa 
Varadarajan, Improvement Doctrines, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 657, 672 (2014) (describing 
Melms as the “landmark case” of when “American courts began to relax this absolute rule of 
waste in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries”); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Absolute 
Preferences and Relative Preferences in Property Law, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2157, 2183 n.157 (2012) 
(describing Melms as “[a] leading American case that breaks with the English common law 
rule”).
373. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1058.  In its earliest iterations, the common law held that 
the “[p]ulling down of a mansion-house” was not only waste, but actually an “aggravated 
act[] of waste,” which might be restrained in equity despite a covenant providing the prop-
erty “without impeachment of waste.” YOOL, supra note 23, at 15–16. The tenant was re-
quired to keep a house in good order even “though no timber grow on the ground.” COKE
ON LITTLETON § 53a (8th ed. 1822). However, other cases point to a different result by the 
mid-nineteenth century. Writing in 1863, George Yool found that English courts would up-
hold the action of the defendant in removing a building provided that the value of the 
property remained stable or increased. YOOL, supra note 23, at 60–61. Henry Roscoe, in his 
treatise, finds that “[i]f the house be ruinous at the time of the tenant’s coming in, yet, if he 
pull it down, it will be waste; unless he re-build it.” 1 HENRY ROSCOE, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF ACTIONS RELATING TO REAL PROPERTY 81–82 (1840). Roscoe goes on to say that 
pulling down a house and rebuilding will be acceptable, provided that the new house is 
neither smaller nor larger than the old one. Id. On the other hand, Roscoe does find that 
converting a house to another purpose will be waste, even if the conversion increases the 
property value. Id. at 82. See also Greene v. Cole 85 Eng. Rep. 1037 (KB) 1047 (discussing 
how the building of a new house might or might not be waste, and requiring a new build-
ing to precisely match the size of the old one). 
374. See supra Section IV.B. 
375. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1079. 
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and value change].”376  In support of this Merrill cites to Melms, which 
briefly discussed two English cases, and reasoned that “‘even in Eng-
land’ a change in agricultural uses by a tenant ‘will not be enjoined in 
equity when it clearly appears that the change will be, in effect, a meli-
orating change which rather improves the inheritance than injures 
it.’”377  In support of this proposition, Melms cited Doherty v. Allman
(1878)378 and In re McIntosh (1891)379 and Merrill provides no additional 
support.380  As we have seen, however, the cases that Merrill cites are 
not English cases following the old rule, but the new one.381  Merrill 
neglected to recognize that the English courts had already shifted from 
the original law of waste to embrace the new rule. 
Notably, it does not seem that the court in Melms would have sup-
ported Merrill’s suggestion that the English courts still maintained the 
old rule and that Doherty and In re McIntosh indicated that the old rule 
would have allowed for value-enhancing shifts in land use.  Although 
Merrill does not discuss Bewes, Melms relies on Bewes when deciding 
to adopt the new rule, specifically citing the pages where Bewes dis-
cusses how England had already adopted the new rule.382  Bewes, of 
course, not only finds that the English adoption of the new rule dates 
to the mid-nineteenth century, but also points to a case that addressed 
not agricultural changes, but the tearing down of a barn and building 
of another in a different location a significant distance away.383
The better understanding is that Melms contributed to the solidify-
ing a trend that had already begun in the United States, with cases 
such as Pynchon v. Stearns,384 and followed the new rule as it had al-
376. Id. at 1079–80. 
377. Id. at 1080 n.114. 
378. [1878] 3 App. Cas. 709 (HL) (appeal taken from N. Ir.). 
379. (1891) 61 LJR 164 (Eng.). 
380. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1080 n.114. 
381. See supra Section IV.A. 
382. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 12, 79 N.W. 738, 739 (1899). 
383. BEWES, supra note 20, at 130. Jones v. Chappell, decided in 1875, also indicates that 
the English courts had already considered and adopted the new rule in the context of build-
ings. In Jones, the court concluded that the old rule of “[i]f the tenant build a new house it is 
w[aste]” was “not the law at the present time.” BEWES, supra note 20, at 138 (quoting Jones 
v. Chappell [1875] 20 LR Eq. 539 (Eng.) 540). 
384. Merrill describes Melms as “a milestone in a transformation in the law of waste 
that took place in the twentieth century.” Merrill states that “[b]efore Melms, all courts 
would have regarded the deliberate destruction of a house to be waste. Indeed, any material
alteration of property by someone temporarily in possession was regarded as waste.” Mer-
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ready been established in England.385  Merrill has argued against the 
development narrative, finding “that transformation was not a mani-
festation of inexorable social and economic change.  Rather, it was a 
top-down reform introduced by the Legal Realist movement.”386  Mer-
rill describes two conflicting decisions—Melms, a Wisconsin case that 
adopted the new rule, and Brokaw v. Fairchild,387 a New York case that 
rejected the new rule—as well as subsequent, successful lobbying in 
favor of the Melms decision.388  Merrill concludes that the Melms rule 
prevailed because “[t]he New York reform proved to be highly influ-
ential with bodies such as the American Law Institute, which also 
adopted a test consistent with Melms for inclusion in the Restatement of 
Property.”389
With that said, there remain reasons to be cautious of Merrill’s em-
phasis on Melms.  In particular, treatise writers at the turn of the centu-
ry appear to have found the changes in waste law fully under way ra-
ther than just nascent with Melms.390  Merrill’s distinguishing of earlier 
cases fails to convince; contrary evidence suggests Melms was not a 
landmark case.  For that reason, it is hard to see Melms as the turning 
point in American law.  Merrill’s more persuasive argument involves 
the influence of Melms on the American Law Institute.  Merrill may in-
deed be correct that the backlash against a New York case, Brokaw,391
may have spurred American jurisdictions to more rapidly adopt the 
new waste rule.392  Merrill suggests that the Melms decision became so 
significant because the New York Law Review Commission, which 
recommended that Brokaw be overturned, adopted the reasoning in 
Melms, and the Review Commission, in turn, influenced the American 
Law Institute.393
The timing of the shift matters for determining what factors influ-
rill, supra note 11, at 1058. See Pynchon v. Stearns, 52 Mass. 304 (1846).
385. Supra Part V. 
386. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1080. 
387. 237 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1929), aff’d mem. per curiam, 245 N.Y.S. 402 (App. Div. 
1930), aff’d mem. per curiam, 177 N.E. 186 (N.Y. 1931). 
388. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1082–83. 
389. Id. at 1083. 
390. Supra Part V. 
391. Brokaw v. Fairchild, 237 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1929), aff’d mem. per curiam, 245 N.Y.S. 
402 (App. Div. 1930), aff’d mem. per curiam, 177 N.E. 186 (N.Y. 1931). 
392. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1082–83. 
393. Id.
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enced the change.  A shift that did not occur at the time of the Ameri-
can Revolution, but roughly half a century later, casts doubt on the 
idea that courts transformed waste due to pressures from land devel-
opment.  A shift in doctrine would have been enormously more useful 
during earlier eras.  In general, the earlier the shift the more useful it 
would have been for citizens to take advantage of the rule in develop-
ing land.  As it happens, the shift was quite late.  Given how much 
more useful the shift would have been earlier on, it is harder to see the 
social and economic pressures of land development as the primary 
force behind the changes in waste law. 
VI. THE NEW HISTORY OF WASTE LAW AND A CRITIQUE OF MODERN
LEGAL HISTORY THEORY AND METHODS
This new history of waste law differs from the traditional accounts 
in two ways that matter deeply for those who study legal history.  
First, the new history demonstrates that the change in waste law was 
not a radical throwing out of old laws in response to economic pres-
sures.394  Instead, the change maintained fidelity to existing legal doc-
trine.395  Second, while previous accounts source change in the social 
and economic pressures of development or the persuasiveness of cer-
tain lobbyists and reformers, this Article demonstrates that law shifted 
in response to modernizations in technology and did so logically and 
to maintain coherence within the existing doctrines.396  The changes in 
waste law do not support a story that casts law as entirely malleable.397
Instead, the changes show that property law shifted slowly, even if in 
response to social contexts, and maintained fidelity to past doctrine.398
These differences matter not just because of the role waste law has 
played in understanding American law more generally.  Correcting 
the story of waste law in America also provides an impetus to correct 
the methodology of modern legal history.  Accurately understanding 
waste law requires knowledge of both the social contexts (here, science 
and technology more directly than economic development) and the 
doctrinal history.  Without maintaining doctrinal investigation as a key 
methodological component, law and society approaches risk anachro-
394. Supra Part IV. 
395. Supra Part IV. 
396. Supra Part III. 
397. Supra Part IV. 
398. Supra Part IV. 
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nistic pulls such as the sense of the inevitability of development that 
will, as they did in the case of waste law, distort our understanding of 
the history. 
A. A Critique of Modern Theories and Methods of Legal History
Prior to the movement to emphasize socio-economic contexts in le-
gal history, scholars tended to focus on the slow evolution of doctrine.  
In general, “[h]istorians did a good deal of ‘line-tracing’—connecting 
the doctrines to be found in judicial decisions . . . —in a kind of ‘follow 
the dots’ intellectual exercise.”399  Valid criticisms of this method soon 
emerged.  It “tend[ed] to rarify and isolate the law as a factor in histor-
ical change.”400  Moreover, isolating law implicitly suggested that law 
was entirely immune to the complex forces of socio-economics, as well 
as other social pressures and circumstances that fell short of revolu-
tion. 
Hurst and Horwitz drove a reactionary force against this trend and 
for decades now, historians instead have focused on the complexities 
of law and social change, incorporating disciplines from psychology 
and sociology to anthropology and economics.  Horwitz, in particular, 
influenced legal scholarship enormously,401 and did so particularly 
with his Transformation of American Law, the book that included his 
previously discussed reflections on waste law.402  Theoretically, Hor-
witz developed his approach more fully in Transformations II, which 
explicitly tackled the subject of the relationship between law and poli-
399. Harry N. Scheiber, Law and American Agricultural Development, 52 AGRIC. HIST.
439, 439 (1978). 
400. Id.
401.  Daniel Hamilton and Al Brophy have honored Horwitz with their edited book, 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR MORTON
J. HORWITZ (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009). 
On the other hand, Tomlins argues that Hurst, rather than Horwitz, provided the primary 
metanarrative that “endures as a default setting” for legal history—the idea of the nation 
the law built. See Christopher Tomlins, American Legal History in Retrospect and Prospect: Re-
flections on the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of Morton Horwitz’s Transformation of American Law, 28 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1135, 1141 (2003). Tomlins sees Horwitz as continuing the tradition of 
Hurst rather than providing any new metanarrative. Id. at 1142. 
402. Tomlins describes the book as having “a major influence on the field of American 
legal history” and being “a focus for legal historical scholarship.” See Tomlins, supra note 
401, at 1136. Laura Kalman finds that “routinely do legal historians today make The Trans-
formation of American Law their starting point.” Laura Kalman, Transformations, 28 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 1149, 1149 (2003). 
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tics.403  As Sunstein summarized it, the “overriding theme” of the book 
was “the rise and fall of ‘Classical Legal Thought.’”404  Tomlins de-
scribed “Horwitz’s key claim to innovation” within legal history as 
proving “that the history of law was in crucial respects indistinguisha-
ble from past politics.”405  Horwitz, according to Tomlins, “discov-
er[ed] that law was . . . thoroughly embedded in social conflict and 
covered with the finger-prints of the powerful.”406  Law, for Horwitz, 
was “what society’s ‘powerful groups’ used to confound and confine 
the rest.”407  Following Horwitz, legal history has embraced a realist, 
“law and society” approach, looking for explanations for legal change 
in social forces. 
Yet, focusing on the social context, particularly with a modern lens 
and without a solid doctrinal investigation, leads to conclusions like 
Sprankling’s on waste: “Driven by the instrumentalist vision, nine-
teenth-century American courts resoundingly jettisoned the waste doc-
trine’s ban on clearing forest land for cultivation.”408  As this Article 
demonstrates, privileging the social context above tracing the evolu-
tion of legal doctrines ultimately distorts the role of law in early Amer-
ican society, suggesting that it was much more flexible and responsive 
to socio-economic change than it necessarily was.409  The focus on law 
as a construct effective for achieving social, economic, and spatial 
goals can distort the nature of law as an independent, stable, and in-
ternally consistent structure of society—one that promotes social sta-
bility and affirms existing rights and investments, particularly where 
property is concerned.  Too much emphasis on social contexts, and 
particularly on anachronistic future outcomes such as environmental 
destruction, neglects the role of law as a conservative force in society—
making changes, particularly in property rights, more difficult to 
achieve. 
Few voices have spoken against the strength of the law and society 
403. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 272 (1992). 
404. Cass R. Sunstein, Where Politics Ends, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 3, 1992, at 38, 38. 
405. See Tomlins, supra note 401, at 1136. Tomlins suggests that legal historians have 
moved toward politics to fill the “vacuum left” after historians outside law abandoned poli-
tics for social and cultural history. 
406. Id. at 1137. 
407. Id. at 1140. 
408. Sprankling, supra note 8, at 534–36. 
409. Supra Parts II, III. 
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movement in legal history.  Yet, quiet rumblings periodically question 
how much we have abandoned our native methodologies.  Upon pub-
lication of Horwitz’s Transformations II, Cass Sunstein responded by 
criticizing the book for focusing too much on scholarship of law and 
too little on the actual “concrete developments in American law.”410
Part of the problem is that the law and society approach to legal histo-
ry suggests where to look for sources of change, but in the end is far 
more a vision of what law is than it is a demonstrable methodology.  
The result is, a great deal of the time, that legal history lacks a method-
ology. 
Legal historians are, admittedly, not really alone in suffering from 
this malady.  Historical method may be floundering as much outside 
law as in it.  David Henige recently argued, “[h]istorical method was 
once a centerpiece of the historiographical enterprise, but this day 
seems long gone.”411  As historians outside law seek to reestablish their 
methods, legal historians should embrace a similar impulse. 
B. A Prescription for Modern Legal Historians
What modern legal historians seem to have lost over the years is 
their native methodology: the simple and sometimes tedious exercise 
of tracing the evolution of doctrine.  Beginning at the beginning and 
ending at the end.  It is only through tracing the evolution of doctrine 
that historians capture the permanence of law—law’s consistency or 
fidelity to itself. 
Consider the importance of law’s fidelity to itself in the story of 
waste law.  This Article demonstrates that through the transformation 
of the common law of waste to the modern rule both English and 
American courts maintained substantial fidelity to existing law.  That 
fidelity is all the more significant if one accepts Merrill’s argument: 
Merrill suggested that the new rule, as a default, is not so efficient or 
useful when compared to a standard prohibiting all change and allow-
ing the parties to contract around the rule.412  Merrill finds that a strict 
rule prohibiting changes is one that is both a bargain-inducing default 
rule, as well as a rule consistent with “broader understandings about 
the value and function of property as an institution in our society.”413
410. Sunstein, supra note 404, at 40. 
411. DAVID HENIGE, HISTORICAL EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT 8 (2005). 
412. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1092–93. 
413. Id.
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If Merrill is correct, then courts in both countries adhered faithfully to 
the value-maintenance standard, dropping the strict approach, even 
when the strict approach was more efficient. 
That’s strong evidence of the power of fidelity.  Such evidence sug-
gests that law maintains significant and structural or systemic prefer-
ences for consistency and fidelity that sometimes, or maybe even often, 
trump other key values such as efficiency.  This Article argues that le-
gal historians should reintegrate the methodology of doctrine-tracing, 
because without it, we have a poorer and less accurate theory of the 
role of law in society and the process of transformations of law. 
Methodologically, doctrine tracing provides a way to locate the ev-
idence of law’s continuities and fidelities.  There are, of course, many 
examples of law’s fidelity, for better or worse.  At times law maintains 
doctrines based on incorrect information (such as antiquated princi-
ples of science), perhaps persisting long beyond what we might rea-
sonably expect in light of the time necessary for procedural mecha-
nisms to force their reconsideration in legislatures and courts.414  While 
there is nothing to celebrate about our uncorrected errors, there is 
something worth noticing in the pattern in terms of the strength of 
law’s consistency over time.  Moreover, historians need methods for 
locating the evidence of continuities.  The reigning methods of modern 
legal history, with their focus on social pressures and transformation, 
capture moments of change; they do not focus on the many pressures 
that keep laws in place for centuries, even when the laws aren’t ideal. 
Yet, historians, it is fair to say, have abandoned tracing the evolu-
tion of doctrine as an approach to legal history.  Most historians focus 
on social factors and economic circumstances that may influence law 
without giving much attention to the power of law to resist social 
change and maintain fidelity to past precedents.415  In the context of 
property law, that power may be all the more important due to vested 
rights and the risk of takings claims resulting from significant shifts in 
doctrine.  In the context of waste law transformation, Horwitz, Spran-
kling, and Purdy all emphasized the social circumstances and disre-
garded the continuities of law;416 the result was a skewed history of 
how waste law changed in America.  Doctrine tracing, as exemplified 
in this Article, provides a way to ease back along the continuum from 
414. Sprankling, supra note 8, at 536. 
415. Supra Part I. 
416. Supra Part IV. 
39285-m
qt_100-3 Sheet No. 129 Side B      06/19/2017   09:53:44
39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 129 Side B      06/19/2017   09:53:44
C M
Y K
4 FRALEY-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/17 1:56 PM
920 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:861 
the law and society approach. 
The point here is not that we have gone entirely astray in looking 
to legal and societal approaches in legal history.  This is not an argu-
ment against law as a social creation, but instead a push toward recog-
nizing that law, at least within common law systems, maintains nu-
merous mechanisms such as stare decises and vested rights that give 
law a unique role in society, making it a force for perseverance and 
stability.  To account for legal change fully, legal history needs meth-
odologies that gather precisely this kind of evidence: evidence of law’s 
fidelity and resistance to change due to specific legal mechanisms.  To 
accurately understand transformations in law, historians cannot allow 
investigations of social context to absolve them of the duty to conduct 
a parallel investigation of the doctrinal history. 
This argument does not aim to topple law and society approaches, 
but rather to suggest that historians have gone too far along the spec-
trum, favoring social explanations for legal change and ignoring con-
sistencies maintained through the evolution of doctrine.  This Article 
suggests not that we depart from the law and society approach entire-
ly, but rather that historians reintegrate the distinctly legal history 
methodology of tracing the evolution of doctrine.  When the law and 
society approach could have enriched our own distinct methodology, 
it instead, unfortunately, largely replaced it. 
VII.  CONCLUSION
Waste law has been transformational well beyond its bounds with-
in legal scholarship.  It has supported arguments for new approaches 
to legal history and provided a concrete world in which to explore 
complex issues of property theory.  Following that trend, this Article 
contributes to the overall literature on waste law, offering a number of 
important correctives to existing accounts, but also employs the story 
of waste law’s transformation to a greater purpose, offering a critique 
of current methods in legal history. 
This Article offers a new history of waste law—the first to engage 
the development of the doctrine within the common law prior to the 
adoption of the modern rule.  This new history demonstrates the flaws 
in the traditional account, which described a transformation that was 
uniquely American and driven by the economics of land development.  
This Article demonstrates that rather than creating a unique and dis-
tinctively American rule, our courts transformed waste law both con-
temporaneously with British courts and with a great deal of doctrinal 
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consistency.  In detailing this history, this Article illuminates the two 
distinct functions of waste in the common law, recovering the previ-
ously undescribed boundary-maintenance function.  By analyzing the 
two distinct functions of waste law and delving into the history of the 
boundary-making function in particular, this Article created a new and 
more accurate account of the transformation of waste law. 
Finally, this Article employs the new account of the waste law 
transformation to critique the methodology of modern legal history.  
The Article argues that legal histories have abandoned their traditional 
methodology of tracing the evolution of doctrine in favor of law and 
society approaches that seek social and economic explanations for le-
gal change.  When historians focus on social factors and economic cir-
cumstances that may influence law without giving much attention to 
the power of law to resist social change and maintain fidelity to past 
precedents, they not only create less accurate historical accounts, but 
also skew perceptions of the role of law in society.  The focus on law as 
a construct effective for achieving social, economic and spatial goals 
can distort the nature of law as an independent, stable, and internally 
consistent structure of society—one that promotes social stability and 
affirms existing rights and investments, particularly where property is 
concerned.  In light of these concerns, this Article argues for reintegrat-
ing the distinctly legal history methodology of tracing the evolution of 
doctrine. 
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